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ARTICLE
THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR
REVISITED
John M. Greabe ∗
ABSTRACT
Half a century ago, in Chapman v. California, the Supreme
Court imposed on appellate courts an obligation to vacate or
reverse criminal judgments marred by constitutional error unless
the government demonstrates that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Court did not explain the
juridical status of this obligation or its relation to the federal
harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. In the intervening
years, commentators have struggled to make sense of Chapman.
Some see it as a constitutional mandate. Others view it as an
example of constitutional common law. In The Riddle of
Harmless Error, written shortly after Chapman issued, Justice
Roger Traynor argued that § 2111 should govern the field that
Chapman occupies.
The lack of clarity about Chapman’s pedigree has had the
predictable consequence of leaving harmless-error doctrine in an
unsatisfactory state. Most basically, the Court has adopted a
harmless-error test that unduly privileges constitutional error
vis-à-vis nonconstitutional error. Moreover, the Court has
prescribed application of an easily manipulated jurisprudence of
labels to determine whether an error is amenable to
harmless-error review. Finally, the Court has unnecessarily
∗
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complicated the application of harmless-error analysis on
collateral review and, along the way, shown insufficient regard
for rule-of-law values.
This Article takes a fresh look at what the Constitution
requires of reviewing courts when they conclude that a criminal
judgment has been tainted by constitutional error. It suggests
that new insights may be found by situating harmless-error
doctrine within a broader, transcontextual analysis of how
constitutional remedies function. It then demonstrates how
understanding what the Constitution requires of reviewing
courts can serve as a springboard for necessary reform.
Ultimately, it argues that the Supreme Court can and should
jettison Chapman in favor of a simplified, unitary, and
transcontextual harmless-error test—reconceived as an
elaboration of 28 U.S.C. § 2111—that largely tracks the approach
for which Justice Traynor argued. Under this test, a reviewing
court would set aside any conviction tainted by error unless it
concludes that it was highly probable that the error did not affect
the judgment. A reviewing court also would set aside any
conviction tainted by error if the error undermined fundamental
constitutional values.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly half a century since Justice Roger J.
Traynor published The Riddle of Harmless Error. 1 The book was
a response to many of the questions raised and left unanswered
by the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Chapman v.
California. 2 Chapman is the source of two important,
interrelated precepts that inform the work of federal and state
appellate courts on a daily basis. First, a court conducting direct
review of a criminal conviction is not under an unyielding duty to
vacate or reverse when a trial judge or prosecutor has committed
a federal constitutional violation during the judicial proceedings
that led to the conviction. 3 But second, the court must set the
conviction aside if the government fails to establish that the error
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 4 My concern is with
the second holding—that reviewing courts must provide remedies
for errors not shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. I will refer to this holding as the “Chapman principle.”
The juridical status of the Chapman principle is an enigma,
despite the efforts of Traynor and others to shine an illuminating
light upon it. Although Chapman states that the principle
derives from federal law, 5 the Supreme Court has never specified
its precise source. Is it a constitutional mandate rooted in
underlying constitutional criminal trial rights or the obligation of
1. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970). As Traynor
recognized, harmless-error doctrines apply in both the criminal and civil contexts. See,
e.g., id. at 16–17, 48–49. For the most part, however, Traynor focused on the criminal
side, where harmless-error standards have received far more attention and proven to be
far more controversial. I too will confine my focus to harmless-error review on direct and
collateral review of criminal convictions.
2. 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967).
3. Id. at 21–22.
4. Id. at 24.
5. The Court stated: “Whether a conviction for a crime should stand when a State
has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a
federal question as what particular constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they
guarantee, and whether they have been denied.” Id. at 21.
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appellate courts to provide due process? Several commentators
have characterized it in this way. 6 Alternatively, is it a
subconstitutional rule that serves as an example of what
Professor Henry P. Monaghan calls “constitutional common
law”? 7 Professor Daniel J. Meltzer and others have so described
it. 8 And what is its relation to 28 U.S.C. § 2111, a federal statute
that directs reviewing courts to withhold remedies for all errors
that have not affected the substantial rights of the parties? 9
Traynor thought that § 2111 should govern the field that
Chapman occupies, and he proposed that the Court treat future
harmless-error decisions as elaborations of the statute. 10
The lack of clarity about Chapman’s pedigree has had the
predictable consequence of leaving harmless-error doctrine in an
unsatisfactory state. Most basically, the Supreme Court has
never offered a coherent defense of its practice of “privileging”
constitutional errors: i.e., insisting that constitutional errors
merit a remedy unless shown to have been harmless “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” while requiring that nonconstitutional errors
be evaluated under a more forgiving standard. 11 Moreover, the
6. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1912–18 (2014) (suggesting that harmless-error analysis be constitutionalized and rooted
in the Constitution’s due process guarantee); Stephen H. Goldberg, Harmless Error:
Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 424 n.31 (1980)
(characterizing the Chapman principle as a “constitutional judgment”).
7. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional
Common Law]; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 1989 S. CT. REV. 195, 200 n.30 (describing Chapman as an example of
constitutional common law). Monaghan defines constitutional common law as “a
substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions.” Monaghan,
Constitutional Common Law at 2–3.
8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1994); Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Harmless Error as Constitutional
Common Law: Congress’s Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 985,
1009–12 (1993). I too have subscribed to this description of Chapman. See John M. Greabe,
Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 920 & n.197
(2014).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012) states: “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.” The statute is operationalized in the federal courts through FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 61, both of which instruct courts to withhold remedies for errors
that did not affect the substantial rights of a party.
10. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 42.
11. See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 695–97
(2013) (explaining that, while constitutional errors amenable to harmless-error review
must be shown on direct appeal to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (per
Chapman), nonconstitutional errors are subject to a “more forgiving standard” and may
be disregarded where there is “fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially

Do Not Delete

2016]

9/21/2016 5:34 PM

HARMLESS ERROR REVISITED

63

Court’s most important “clarification” of Chapman, provided in
Arizona v. Fulminante in 1991, 12 has caused more problems than
it has solved. In Fulminante, the Court held that courts
conducting direct review of convictions should always provide
remedies for “structural defects,” 13 but should conduct
harmless-error review of all “trial errors.” 14 Yet the Court has
operationalized the Fulminante framework in unprincipled and
unpredictable ways. 15 Finally, on collateral review, the Court
continues
to
require
application
of
a
confusing,
more-forgiving-than-Chapman harmless-error test—a practice
begun in Brecht v. Abrahamson in 1993 16—even though
subsequently enacted limitations on the availability of collateral
relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”) are more than sufficient to protect federalism
values and address other concerns raised by habeas-based
reversals. 17
swayed by the error”) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
12. 499 U.S. 279, 306–09 (1991).
13. Id. at 309 (defining “structural defects” as “defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. Id. at 307–08 (defining “trial errors” as “error[s] which occur[] during the
presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed
in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [their] admission
was harmless”).
15. For a sampling of the commentary critical of Fulminante, see Roger A. Fairfax,
Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2038–40 (2008) (arguing that the Court is undermining the
institutional significance of the jury by holding, subsequent to Fulminante, that
instructional errors that preclude the jury from returning a verdict on all elements of the
charged offense are nonstructural); David McCord, The “Trial/Structural” Error
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1414 (1997) (arguing
that the structural error/trial error framework is inherently flawed and has proved to be
unworkable); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 154 (1991)
(criticizing the single-minded focus on the accuracy of convictions inherent in the trial
error/structural defect dichotomy); see also, e.g., Michael Coenen, Spillover Across
Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1235–39 (2014) (noting that the Fulminante framework
can cause courts to define structural rights too narrowly in order to avoid the strong
medicine of automatic reversal); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 891─92 (1999) (similar); Steven M. Shephard,
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L. J. 1180,
1185–86, 1201 (2008) (similar, arguing against a rule of automatic reversal of structural
errors); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (1998) (similar, discussing the equal protection right protected
by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
16. See 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).
17. The limiting principles in question are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012),
which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

Do Not Delete

64

9/21/2016 5:34 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[54:1

In short, the riddle of harmless error is ripe for revisiting.
This paper undertakes the task. Part I provides essential
background about the development of the harmless-error
doctrine and the range of views about its essential nature. It then
demonstrates the possibility of a conceptual breakthrough by
supplementing the debate over ontology (what is the Chapman
principle?) with an analysis of remedial function (how does the
setting aside of a criminal conviction serve as a remedy for a
constitutional violation at trial?). A functional approach proves
useful because it helps to define the border between
constitutionally compelled and constitutionally gratuitous
remedies. Generally speaking, the Constitution requires courts to
provide specific remedies responsive to ongoing constitutional
violations, but permits courts to weigh the costs and benefits of
substitutionary remedies for wholly concluded constitutional
wrongs and to withhold such remedies if their costs would be too
great.
This functional insight leads to the paper’s foundational
hypothesis: while reviewing courts must remedy an ongoing
infringement of constitutional rights worked by conviction under
a facially unconstitutional statute or a statute that cannot be
constitutionally applied on the facts of the case, the Supreme
Court and Congress are otherwise free to craft harmless-error
doctrines that reflect the lessons of experience. This freedom
flows from the fact that, once we set to the side the exception
involving conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional or
unconstitutionally applied statute, an order vacating or reversing
a tainted judgment provides substitutionary relief for a wholly
concluded wrong; it does not deliver a constitutionally compelled
remedy.
Part II turns to the current state of harmless-error doctrine
and argues that it is unsatisfactory. It exposes three principal
problems. First, the Supreme Court has adopted a
harmless-error framework that unduly privileges constitutional
error vis-à-vis nonconstitutional error. Second, the Court has
prescribed application of a flawed, easily manipulated
jurisprudence of labels to determine whether an error is
amenable to harmless-error review. Third, the Court has
unnecessarily complicated the application of harmless-error
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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analysis on collateral review and, along the way, shown an
insufficient regard for rule-of-law values.
Part III begins by observing that, with clarity about how
little the Constitution requires with respect to harmless-error
review, the path is open to reforms that could ameliorate each of
the problems described in Part II. It then argues that the
Supreme Court should jettison the Chapman principle and
abandon the structural defect/trial error dichotomy in favor of a
simplified, unitary, and transcontextual harmless-error test—
reconceived as an elaboration of 28 U.S.C. § 2111—that tracks
the approach for which Traynor argued in The Riddle of
Harmless Error. Under this approach, the Court should instruct
reviewing courts to set aside a judgment tainted by any error
(whether constitutional or not) unless they conclude that it was
highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.
Beyond this, the Court should emphasize that, even when
guilty of the crimes charged, appellants and petitioners pressing
claims of constitutional error serve as private attorneys general
and therefore function as essential instruments for ensuring
proper regard for fundamental constitutional values.
Accordingly, the Court should authorize reviewing courts to
exercise their power to set aside judgments tainted by error in
circumstances where, regardless of whether it is highly probable
that the error affected the judgment, an exercise of remedial
discretion is necessary to vindicate such values. Such
circumstances certainly include errors that undermine the
rights to an impartial judge, a jury instruction that correctly
states the relevant standard of proof, the assistance of counsel
for the accused, and a fair jury. They also should include, but
are not necessarily limited to, judicial proceedings marred by
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity, national origin, or gender and intentional misconduct
by government officials such as judges, prosecutors, and police
or probation officers.
II. THE BASICS OF HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW: EVOLUTION,
ONTOLOGY & CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
A sound solution to a legal problem—indeed, a sound
solution to most any problem—typically requires an
understanding of how the problem came to be and the context
within which it arises. So it is with harmless-error review. The
path towards improvement opens upon a close analysis of the
doctrine’s origins and nature, the role it plays within the field of
remedies, and the constitutional constraints within which it
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operates. This Part supplies such an analysis and uses it to
develop the hypothesis that grounds the paper’s call for reform:
courts conducting harmless-error review must reverse judgments
that infringe the appellant’s or petitioner’s life, liberty, or
property interests through an ongoing unconstitutional
application of positive law but are otherwise free—at least so far
as the Constitution is concerned—to exercise guided discretion in
deciding whether an error warrants a remedy.
A. A Brief History
1. Harmless Error on Direct Review. The harmless-error
doctrine, like so many other American legal doctrines, finds its
roots in the English common law. 18 Historical accounts of the
harmless-error doctrine’s development frequently begin with
Crease v. Barrett, 19 an 1835 decision of the Court of the
Exchequer that curtailed the then-prevalent practice in English
appellate courts to affirm any judgment which, in the opinion of
the reviewing court, had reached the correct result. 20 The Crease
decision became associated—incorrectly, in the view of Justice
Traynor—with an emergent, mid-nineteenth century English
practice of reversing nearly all criminal and civil judgments tied
to proceedings in which some error had occurred. 21
In 1873, Parliament responded to this perceived appellate
hypertechnicality with a statute called the Judicature Act, whose
purpose was to encourage reviewing courts to return to the
practice of vacating or reversing civil judgments only if they
thought that the wrong party had won. 22 The Judicature Act was
ineffective; appellate judges continued to order new trials in
almost all cases in which they found error. 23 In 1907, Parliament
tried again with another new law called the Criminal Appeal Act,
which directed appellate judges to dismiss criminal appeals,
notwithstanding any meritorious assertion of error, if “no
substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.” 24 Once
18. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 4.
19. (1835) 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1359.
20. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 6–8.
21. See id. at 4–8 (disagreeing with the depiction of Crease as having adopted a rule
of near automatic reversal and laying the blame for its mischaracterization on subsequent
English decisions which did not accurately describe its holding, and on John Henry
Wigmore, who accepted the accuracy of these mischaracterizations in his famous treatise
on evidence) (citing 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 368 (3d ed. 1940))
22. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 8–9 (citing the Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37
Vict., c. 66 ¶ 48).
23. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 9–10.
24. See id. at 10–11 (citing the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(1)).
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again, however, English judges largely ignored the statute and
continued to reverse with great frequency—a result Traynor
found surprising in view of the fact that, in the English system,
the double jeopardy doctrine precluded retrial upon reversal of a
criminal judgment. 25
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
American appellate courts behaved much like their English
counterparts, applying a rule approximating automatic
reversal. 26 Retrials were common, and appellate courts were
criticized for “tower[ing] above the trials of criminal cases as
impregnable citadels of technicality.” 27 In 1946, in Kotteakos v.
United States, the Supreme Court characterized the era as
follows: “So great was the threat of reversal, in many
jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing
reversible error in the record, only to have repeated the same
matching of wits when a new trial had been thus obtained.” 28
American appellate hypertechnicality spurred federal and
state legislative reform efforts, which were led by prominent
members of the bar and legal academy. 29 In 1919, after
considerable deliberation, Congress enacted a federal
harmless-error statute, Judicial Code § 269, 28 U.S.C. § 391,
which provided:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or
motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the
court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. 30

25. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 11.
26. See John M. M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error Review
of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV.
819, 823 (1994). I draw with liberality from my previous article in sketching the
development of harmless-error review in the United States.
27. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by
Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925) (quoted in Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)).
28. 328 U.S. at 759.
29. See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2033 (observing that one prominent reform
committee included Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, and William H. Taft); see also
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 758–60 & nn.10–14 (providing examples of the extent of legislative
reform efforts and the extensive commentary of prominent legal scholars).
30. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 39, 62 Stat. 892, 998.
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By 1926, eighteen states also had enacted laws directing their
appellate courts to ignore harmless errors, and ten more had
established some sort of similar rule by judicial pronouncement. 31
These reform efforts did not have the impact for which their
proponents had hoped, as American appellate courts continued to
vacate and reverse with great frequency over the next couple of
decades. 32 In the mid-1940s, however, Congress and the Supreme
Court took additional steps towards implementing a more
rigorous application of harmless-error review. Congress did so by
acquiescing in the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which contained a harmless-error provision that
tracked the language of the 1919 federal harmless-error statute
but omitted the descriptor “technical” before the word “errors.” 33
The Supreme Court did so in its Kotteakos decision, which
constituted the first serious elaboration of how courts should
conduct harmless-error review under the 1919 statute.
In Kotteakos, a jury had convicted the petitioners of a single
conspiracy to violate the National Housing Act even though, as
the government admitted on appeal, the evidence had established
eight or more different conspiracies of the same sort conducted
through a common figure. 34 The question presented was whether
the variance between the single conspiracy charged in the
indictment and the multiple conspiracies proved at trial
constituted a technical error or defect that did not affect the
substantial rights of the parties within the meaning of the
federal harmless-error statute. 35 Holding that the error did not
fall within the reach of the statute and therefore required the
31. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 823 n.23 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(a), at 258 n.5 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
32. See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2034.
33. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a), which provided that “[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded”). The
then recently enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also contained a harmless-error
provision, FED. R. CIV. P. 61. In 1948, Congress repealed the 1919 federal harmless-error
statute, see supra note 30, on the view that the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
Procedure now contained the necessary directives. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 21 &
n.86. In 1949, however, Congress enacted the current federal harmless-error statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2111, out of an apparently misplaced concern that the Federal Rules applied only
to federal district courts, and not to federal appeals courts or the U.S. Supreme Court. See
id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 81-352 (1949), as reprinted in 1949 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 1248,
1272); see also Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139 § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111). The 1949 enactment also omits the adjective “technical,” which had modified the
phrase “errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties” in the 1919 statute. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. It thus directs
reviewing courts to disregard all errors that do not affect substantial rights. See supra
note 9 for the full text of § 2111.
34. 328 U.S. at 752.
35. See id. at 757–58.
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award of a new trial, 36 the Supreme Court clarified that the
question hinged on whether the error had “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 37
In a thoughtful passage elaborating what the analysis under
this standard should entail, Justice Rutledge stated:
Some aids to right judgment may be stated more safely in
the negative than in affirmative form. Thus, it is not the
appellate court’s function to determine guilt or
innocence . . . . Nor is it to speculate upon probable
reconviction and decide according to how the speculation
comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such
impressions. But they may not make them sole criteria for
reversal or affirmance. Those judgments are exclusively for
the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence
legally sufficient to sustain the conviction unaffected by the
error . . . .
But this does not mean that the appellate court can
escape altogether taking account of the outcome. To weigh
the error’s effect against the entire setting of the record
without relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost
to work in a vacuum . . . . In criminal causes that outcome
is conviction. This is different, or may be, from guilt in fact.
It is guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen.
And the question is, not were [the jurors] right in their
judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the
verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably
may be taken to have had upon the jury’s decision. The
crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the
minds of other men, not on one’s own, in the total
setting . . . .
This must take account of what the error meant to them,
not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all
else that happened. And one must judge others’ reactions
not by his own, but with allowance for how others might
react and not be regarded generally as acting without
reason. This is the important difference, but one easy to
ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from the
record.
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that
the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight
effect, the verdict and judgment should stand, except
perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm
or a specific command of Congress. . . . But if one cannot
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
36.
37.

See id. at 776.
Id. at 776.
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without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it
is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not
affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was
enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected
by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself
had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.38

The dictum “perhaps” exempting constitutional errors from
operation of the statute reflected the practice of the time, which
was to regard an appellate remedy as mandatory in the event of
constitutional error. 39
For the next twenty years or so, the Supreme Court treated
28 U.S.C. § 2111—the new federal harmless-error statute that
Congress enacted in 1949 to replace the 1919 harmless-error
statute 40—as always requiring a new trial if constitutional error
had occurred during the initial trial. 41 But in 1963, in Fahy v.
Connecticut, 42 the Court retreated from this approach and
explicitly raised the question whether the erroneous admission of
evidence obtained by means of a search and seizure that had
violated the Fourth Amendment “can . . . be subject to the normal
rules of ‘harmless error’ under the federal standard of what
constitutes harmless error.” 43 Yet the Court declined to decide
the question it had raised because the admission of evidence at
the petitioner’s trial had been “prejudicial,” a term that the Court
defined by stating that “there is a reasonable possibility that the

38. Id. at 763–65 (citations and footnotes omitted).
39. Greabe, supra note 26, at 824 & n.33 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31,
at 270). It is not clear why Kotteakos treated the error—the variance between the
conspiracy charged and the conspiracies proved—as nonconstitutional. The Fifth
Amendment provides a right of grand jury indictment for an “infamous crime” of the type
for which the petitioners stood convicted, and the petitioners were not indicted for the
crimes that the evidence tended to prove. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Moreover, the Sixth
Amendment provides a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. One court has suggested that the prohibition on variances
between a single conspiracy charged in the indictment and multiple conspiracies being
proved at trial should be understood as a “common law” rule or a rule derived from the
rules prohibiting prejudicial joinder, and not a constitutional rule. See United States v.
Baughm, 449 F.3d 167, 175–76 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But the court fails to provide a
convincing explanation why the victim of such a variance has not suffered a violation of
his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
40. See supra note 33 (explaining the history behind Congress’s 1948 repeal of the
1919 federal harmless-error statute and its 1949 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2111).
41. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 825 (citing Ogletree, supra note 15, at 157 & n.43
(collecting cases)).
42. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
43. Id. at 86.
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evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction.” 44
During these same two decades, the Warren Court was
famously expanding the reach of federal constitutional
protections for criminal defendants. 45 Thus, by the time
Chapman v. California reached the Court in 1967, 46 the field of
constitutional criminal procedure was ripe for what Justice
Benjamin Cardozo described as “taming,” a process by which
novel and potentially far-reaching legal principles are
“reduc[ed] . . . to something that is both apparently more clear
and more objective, and apparently less threatening to
established institutions.” 47 Chapman and its progeny have
certainly served as taming influences in the criminal procedure
field. 48
Chapman, which reached the Supreme Court from the
California state court system, involved a situation where a
prosecutor had commented on the silence of the accused, 49 a
practice held unconstitutional in Griffin v. California in 1965. 50
The California Supreme Court applied the state’s
harmless-error rule, which directed courts to ignore errors that
had not caused a miscarriage of justice, 51 and affirmed the

44. Id. at 86–87.
45. See, e.g., id.; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that state courts
must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants have
a fundamental Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to apprise those in custody of certain
rights).
46. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
47. Greabe, supra note 26, at 825 n.37 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)); Craig Goldblatt, Comment, Disentangling Webb:
Governmental Intimidation of Defense Witnesses and Harmless Error Analysis, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1239, 1243 n.25 (1992) (same).
48. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 825; Ogletree, supra note 15, at 158 (arguing that
the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California has had the effect of practically diluting
many of the constitutional procedural protections first recognized by the Warren Court).
49. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19.
50. 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that prosecutorial comment about the
accused’s failure to testify infringes the accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination).
51. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13 provides:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence,
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
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underlying convictions. 52 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the error had not been harmless. 53 But importantly,
the Court for the first time explicitly acknowledged that “there
may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may . . . be deemed harmless.” 54
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion for himself and six
others. He started by observing that “[w]hether a conviction for a
crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal
constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a
federal question as what particular federal constitutional
provisions mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have
been denied.” 55 He then elaborated:
With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States,
we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect
people from actions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights. We have no hesitation in saying that the right of
these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent—
expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself—is a
federal right which, in the absence of appropriate
congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by
fashioning the necessary rule.56
Justice Stewart would have avoided the harmless-error
question and therefore concurred only in the judgment; he would
have held that a state prosecutor’s violation of the rule in Griffin
v. California should trigger an automatic reversal. 57 Justice
Harlan dissented on the ground that “a state appellate court’s
reasonable application of a constitutionally appropriate state
harmless-error rule to sustain a state conviction constitutes an
independent and adequate state ground of judgment.” 58
In proceeding to “fashion[]” a harmless-error rule applicable
to federal constitutional error, Justice Black stated that he and
others in the majority “prefer the [Fahy v. Connecticut]
approach . . . in deciding what was harmless error”—“whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19–20.
See id. at 24–26.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
Id.
See id. at 45 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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might have contributed to the conviction” 59—to the California
Constitution’s miscarriage-of-justice rule. 60 He then equated the
Fahy statement with the harmless-error principle for which
Chapman has become known, and stated the Court’s holding:
“We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of [Fahy]
when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional
error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 61
In the course of fashioning a new standard of review for
constitutional error, the Chapman majority did not mention
28 U.S.C. § 2111, the federal harmless-error statute, or allude to
the harmless-error analysis conducted in Kotteakos (which was,
as we have seen, an elaboration of § 2111’s statutory
predecessor). Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the Kotteakos inquiry into whether the error
“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict” 62 is to govern nonconstitutional error, whereas
the Chapman analysis is to apply to constitutional error. 63 The
Court also has emphasized that it regards the Kotteakos analysis
as significantly “more forgiving” than the analysis prescribed in
Chapman. 64
In the years since Chapman, the Supreme Court has flirted
with three distinct techniques for determining whether an error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 65 The first, suggested by
Chapman itself, 66 examines only the extent to which the
59. Id. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of Fahy, see supra notes 42–44 and
accompanying text.
60. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22–23. For a statement of relevant California law, see
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
62. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445–49 (1986).
64. See, e.g., Fry v. Pliler, 511 U.S. 112, 116 (2007); see also infra notes 96–97 and
accompanying text (noting that, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 621 (1993), the
Court held that constitutional errors challenged on collateral review should be assessed
for harmlessness under the Kotteakos/§ 2111 test, which it described as “less onerous”
than the “stringent” Chapman test). One lower court has characterized the
Kotteakos/§ 2111 analysis as requiring a reversal unless it is “more probable than not that
the error did not materially affect the verdict.” United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530,
547 (9th Cir. 2010). Compare id., with Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d
791, 799 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that nonconstitutional error should be treated as
harmless “unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the
verdict” (internal quotation omitted)).
65. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828–29.
66. 386 U.S. at 23–24 (“An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which
possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot . . . be conceived of as
harmless.”).

Do Not Delete

74

9/21/2016 5:34 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[54:1

erroneously admitted material tends to be incriminating, without
regard to the untainted evidence. 67 The second looks to whether
the error was “cumulative”—i.e., duplicative of untainted
evidence tending to establish the same fact or facts supported by
the erroneously admitted material. 68 The third analyzes whether
the jury likely gave the erroneously admitted material significant
weight in light of the entire record. 69 The Court appears to have
settled on the third technique as the one reviewing courts should
employ. 70
In holding that constitutional errors should be disregarded if
shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 71 the
Chapman majority acknowledged, and did not retreat from, prior
decisions indicating “that there are some constitutional rights so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error . . . .” 72 The majority listed three such rights—the
right not to have a coerced confession introduced into evidence,
the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge—in
terms suggesting that the list was not necessarily exhaustive. 73
67. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31, at
279–81); Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1977)).
68. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 828 (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
254 (1969)); Field, supra note 67, at 37).
69. Greabe, supra note 26, at 822–23; see Field, supra note 67, at 21–22; see Greabe,
supra note 26, at 828–29 (citing Yates v. United States, 500 U.S. 391, 403–04 (1991)).
70. Greabe, supra note 26 at 829 (citing Yates, 500 U.S. at 403–04 (clarifying that
Chapman requires reviewing courts to weigh the probative force of the untainted evidence
against the probative force of the erroneously admitted material standing alone and to
determine the likely significance of the error upon reasonable jurors); 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 31, at 281 n.5); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1993)
(endorsing and applying the Yates analysis). The Court has at other times and in other
contexts suggested that the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt alone renders an
error harmless. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 829 n.67 (citing, e.g., United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–11 (1983)) (“The question a reviewing court must ask is this:
absent [the improperly admitted material], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?”); Milton v. Wainright, 407 U.S. 371, 372–73
(1972) (similar); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1972) (similar)). But these
statements—which are akin to a “correct result” test of the sort rejected in Chapman, see
386 U.S. at 23–24—are contradicted by the Court’s more carefully reasoned cases, and
should not be taken to express the proper formulation. See Greabe, supra note 26, at 829
n.67 (citing 3 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 279, 281). But see United States v.
Vazquez, 132 S. Ct. 1532, 1532 (2012) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted with respect to a Seventh Circuit decision in which a split panel arguably used
different harmless-error approaches and the majority arguably used the “correct result”
approach); Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred
Lines, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 992–93 (2015) (discussing Vazquez and opining that
“[e]xisting Supreme Court precedent does not clearly endorse” any one approach to
harmless-error review).
71. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id. at 23 n.8 (citations omitted).
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In the following quarter century or so, the Court placed
additional rights within this category on an ad hoc basis. 74 But it
failed to explain how courts should determine whether a given
constitutional error is amenable to harmless-error review until
1991, when it decided Arizona v. Fulminante. 75
In Fulminante, a highly fractured Court returned to the
question whether the erroneous admission into evidence of a
coerced confession should be subject to harmless-error review
under the Chapman principle. 76 In answering that it should, 77
the Court provided a framework for determining whether other
constitutional errors should be subjected to analysis under
Chapman. The Court bifurcated the universe of constitutional
error and suggested that most errors fall into a default category
of “trial” errors—“error[s] which occur[] during the presentation
of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether [their] admission was harmless.” 78 But the
Court also acknowledged a second category of “structural
defects”—“defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,
which defy analysis by harmless-error standards.” 79 More
recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court explained
that structural defects “bear[] directly on the framework within
which the trial proceeds.” 80 It then provided a list of errors that
cause such structural defects: errors having the effect of denying
the right to counsel, 81 self-representation, 82 a public trial, 83 and
an appropriate reasonable-doubt instruction. 84 The Court went
74. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (right to a public trial);
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (right to self-representation).
75. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
76. Id. at 306–12 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.).
77. See id. at 288, 308–09 (rejecting suggestions to the contrary in Chapman, 386
U.S. at 23 & n.8, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 567–68 (1958)). The Fulminante decision contained three different 5–4
majorities. As just stated, five members of the Court concluded that the admission of a
coerced confession could in some circumstances be harmless. Id. at 302–03. A second five
justice majority determined that the confession at issue had indeed been coerced. See id.
at 282, 285–88 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ.).
Finally, a third five justice majority decided that the State had not demonstrated the
error to be harmless. See id. at 295–302 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.).
78. Id. at 307–08.
79. Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. 548 U.S. 140, 148, 150 (2006).
81. See id. at 149–50 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963)).
82. See id. at 149 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78 & n.8 (1984)).
83. See id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)).
84. See id. (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)).
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on to add to the list errors that have the effect of denying the
right to counsel of one’s choice. 85
2. Harmless Error on Collateral Review. From 1967 to
1993, the Supreme Court applied the Chapman principle to all
constitutional errors amenable to harmless-error review,
regardless of whether it was conducting direct review of a state
court judgment, 86 direct review of a federal court judgment, 87 or
review of a federal judgment resolving a collateral attack on a
state court judgment. 88 But in 1993, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 89
the Court held that federal courts conducting collateral review of
state convictions marred by constitutional error should apply the
harmless-error standard from Kotteakos v. United States, 90 which
until then had been applied only to nonconstitutional errors in
federal criminal cases. 91 Thus, a federal court conducting habeas
corpus review of a state court criminal judgment infected by
federal constitutional error should leave the judgment
undisturbed unless the error was shown to have had a
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict”—a showing that was further described as
requiring habeas petitioners to establish more than just a
“reasonable possibility” that the error contributed to the verdict,
and that the error had resulted in “actual prejudice.” 92
Brecht involved a situation where a state prosecutor had
used a state criminal defendant’s silence after receiving the
warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona 93 to impeach the
defendant at trial. 94 After stating that the error fell within
Fulminante’s “trial error” category, 95 the Court considered
whether it should conduct harmless-error review under what it

85. See id. at 150. This past Term, the Court also held that the unconstitutional
participation in appellate proceedings by a presumptively biased judge constitutes
structural error. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016).
86. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24–26 (1967).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–11 (1983).
88. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
579–80 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372–73 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson,
390 U.S. 523, 523–24 (1968) (per curiam).
89. 507 U.S. 619, 631–33 (1993).
90. 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). For a discussion of Kotteakos, see supra notes
34–39 and accompanying text.
91. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631–32.
92. Id. at 637 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
93. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
94. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622–23. Such commentary violates a criminal
defendant’s due process rights. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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called the “stringent” Chapman principle 96 or the “less onerous”
Kotteakos standard. 97 The Court opted for the latter,
emphasizing the state’s interest in the finality of convictions that
have survived direct review, comity, federalism, the interest of
maintaining the prominence of the trial itself (which often had
occurred years earlier), the difficulty of retrials years after the
original trial, and a perceived imbalance of other costs and
benefits of applying Chapman on collateral review. 98 Assessing
the error under the Kotteakos standard, the Court concluded that
it had not had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict because the State’s references to
petitioner’s post-Miranda silence were infrequent and because
the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was, “if not overwhelming, then
certainly weighty.” 99
Three years after Brecht, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, widely
known as the “AEDPA.” 100 The AEDPA contains a provision,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that prohibits the granting of a federal
habeas petition on the ground that a state court has improperly
adjudicated a federal constitutional claim on the merits unless
the state’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .” 101 In 2003, in
Mitchell v. Esparza, the Court held that § 2254(d)(1) applies to
state appellate court determinations that a constitutional
violation is harmless under Chapman and precludes an award of
relief unless the state court’s application of Chapman was itself
unreasonable. 102
In 2007, in Fry v. Pliler, the Court affirmed Brecht’s
continuing relevance post-AEDPA by rejecting the argument that
§ 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in Esparza, eliminates the
requirement
that
a
habeas
petitioner
satisfy
the
Brecht/Kotteakos harmless-error standard in order to obtain a
remedy on habeas corpus review. 103 Rather, Fry held, courts
should continue to treat satisfaction of the Brecht/Kotteakos test
as a precondition of collateral relief. 104 In reaching this
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 632.
Id. at 637.
See id. at 635–37.
See id. at 638–39.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See id. for the entire text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
540 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2003) (per curiam).
551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007).
See id. at 119.
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conclusion, the Court stated that it was “implausible” that the
AEDPA—which sought to limit rather than expand the
availability of habeas relief—would replace “the Brecht standard
of ‘actual prejudice’ with the more liberal AEDPA/Chapman
standard which requires only that the state court’s harmless
-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be unreasonable.” 105
The Court continued: “That said, it certainly makes no sense to
require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/Chapman and
Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the former.” 106
Confusingly, however, in its 2015 decision in Davis v. Ayala,
the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for reading Fry as
authorizing courts entertaining habeas petitions to skip to the end
and only apply the less forgiving Brecht/Kotteakos harmless-error
standard in cases where they conclude that a petitioner has
satisfied the standard.107 The Court stated that, while (per Fry) a
federal habeas court need not formally apply both the
Brecht/Kotteakos and AEDPA/Chapman tests, “that does not
mean, as the Ninth Circuit thought, that a state court’s
harmlessness determination has no significance under Brecht.” 108
Thus, although the Brecht/Kotteakos test “obviously subsumes”
the AEDPA/Chapman test,109 reviewing courts convinced that an
award of relief is appropriate should not simply apply the
Brecht/Kotteakos test without also taking stock of whether a state
appellate court’s Chapman analysis was unreasonable within the
meaning of § 2254(d).110 The Court also emphasized that, in order
to conclude that a state appellate court’s finding of harmlessness
under Chapman was unreasonable, a habeas court must find that
“fair-minded jurists could [not] disagree on its correctness”—i.e.,
that the state appellate court’s decision “was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” 111
3. Summary. We have seen that federal harmless-error
doctrine has evolved in such a way that it now encompasses a
multi-tiered system that distinguishes among four different
105. Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted)
106. Id. at 120.
107. See 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015).
108. Id. (“The Fry Court did not hold—and would have had no possible basis for
holding—that Brecht somehow abrogates the limitation on federal habeas relief that
§ 2254(d) plainly sets out.”).
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. See Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2198.
111. Id. at 2199 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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categories of error: (1) constitutional “structural” errors, which
defy analysis by harmless-error review; 112 (2) constitutional
“trial” errors challenged on direct review, which are
reviewed for harmlessness under the Chapman principle; 113
(3) nonconstitutional trial errors challenged on direct review,
which are reviewed for harmlessness under the Kotteakos test; 114
and (4) constitutional trial errors challenged on collateral review,
which also are reviewed for harmlessness under the
Brecht/Kotteakos test. 115 Beyond this, federal law also supplies a
different, “plain-error” framework for evaluating errors as to
which appellate rights have not been preserved. 116 Under
plain-error review, errors (even constitutional structural
errors) 117 warrant vacatur or reversal only if they were obvious at
the time they were committed, affected the substantial rights of
the claiming party, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in which they
occurred. 118 And as set forth above, additional complications
come into play when federal courts conduct collateral review of
errors of federal constitutional law that have been found
harmless by the state’s appellate courts. 119 Thus, the framework
under which error is to be evaluated in the federal system is
exceptionally complicated. 120
B. The Ontology of Chapman & Its Progeny
Because the Chapman majority said only that the case’s
holding was responsive to a “federal question,” 121 the holding’s

112. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. The Court has never suggested
that a nonconstitutional trial error might be “structural”; indeed, it has implied the
opposite. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 695 n.33.
115. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
116. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing how claims of
error that have been forfeited should be reviewed for plain error under FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(b)).
117. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997) (stating that structural
errors are not subject to automatic reversal but, like other errors, are to be evaluated
under the method prescribed in Rule 52(b) and Olano).
118. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731–37.
119. See supra notes 102–111 and accompanying text.
120. In an excellent recent article, Professor Anne Bowen Poulin canvasses the
various tests (which include but are not limited to the harmless-error tests applied by
reviewing courts and described above) under which courts evaluate the concept of “harm”
in criminal cases. See Poulin, supra note 70, at 1007–13. As Professor Poulin
demonstrates, the complexity of these various tests is truly mind-boggling.
121. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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essential nature (and, by extension, that of Fulminante 122 and
Brecht 123) has perplexed commentators. In The Riddle of
Harmless Error, published three years after Chapman, 124 Justice
Traynor defended the Chapman majority’s “federal question”
holding over Justice Harlan’s dissenting objection 125 that a state
court’s reasonable application of a state harmless-error rule
should constitute an independent and adequate state ground of
judgment not subject to federal review. 126 But Traynor expressed
puzzlement over why the Chapman majority had failed to
recognize that the federal harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) already
occupied the terrain that Chapman purported to cover. 127
Traynor thought that, going forward, the Court ought to rectify
its oversight and rerationalize harmless-error doctrine as an
interpretation of § 2111. 128 Other analysts, in contrast, have
suggested that the Chapman principle should be seen as
constitutional in nature. 129
Professor Daniel J. Meltzer refutes both positions in the
most thorough analysis of Chapman’s ontology that has been
published to date. 130 In disagreeing with Traynor that Chapman
and its progeny are rooted (or at least ought to be seen as rooted)
in § 2111 and Rule 52(a), Meltzer first observes, correctly, that
Rule 52(a) has no bearing on cases such as Chapman that
originate in state courts. 131 With respect to § 2111, Meltzer notes
that the statute enjoins courts to ignore errors that do not affect
122. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 1–2.
125. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
126. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 37–41. Traynor thought that a state
harmless-error rule could apply only if it were procedural, and not substantive. See id. at
38–39. But in Traynor’s view, state harmless-error rules are clearly substantive. See id. at
39–40 (stating that such a rule “has nothing to do with regulating the methods by which
the facts are made known to the court” but rather is “of a piece with substantive rules, for
it too is a mandate to the judge, at this stage the appellate judge, calling for the last word
on the legal effect of the findings”).
127. See id. at 42.
128. See id. (“Once the Chapman case is viewed anew, the crucial question is one of
statutory interpretation, the meaning of the words in Section 2111, ‘errors or defects
which do not affect substantial rights.’”). As we shall see, Justice Traynor then argued for
abandonment of Chapman’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in favor of an analysis,
rooted in § 2111, that would focus on whether it was “highly probable” that the error had
not affected the jury. See id. at 43–51.
129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
130. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 19–21, 26.
131. See id. at 19–20 (observing that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
regulate neither state court cases nor Supreme Court review of such cases but govern only
federal court procedure in criminal cases).
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substantial rights; it does not direct them to vacate or reverse
judgments where substantial rights are affected. 132 Moreover,
unlike Chapman, the statute neither explicitly regulates state
courts engaged in harmless-error review nor differentiates
between constitutional and nonconstitutional error. 133 Thus, it is
not plausible to view the Chapman principle as a product of
statutory interpretation.
If the Chapman principle is not rooted in a federal statute,
does it derive from the Constitution itself? In other words, is its
implicit promise of a remedy unless the government establishes
the harmlessness of a constitutional error beyond a reasonable
doubt constitutionally compelled? Meltzer devotes much of his
paper to consideration of this question, doing far more to develop
an argument in favor of a constitutional basis for the Chapman
principle than any writer who has so characterized the ruling. 134
But Meltzer ultimately concludes that the Chapman principle is
not derived from the Constitution, and, having thus eliminated
both federal statutory law and the Constitution itself as potential
sources of the rule, argues that it is an example of constitutional
common law. 135
As the next subsection explains, I agree with Meltzer that the
remedy Chapman implicitly promises is not constitutionally
compelled, with the qualification that the Constitution does
require reviewing courts possessed of jurisdiction over a case to
reverse when they find that an applicant for relief has been
convicted under a statute that is unconstitutional, either facially

132. See id. at 20. Section 2111’s preoccupation with authorizing reviewing courts to
affirm some judgments notwithstanding the presence of error—rather than specifying
when they should provide remedies—is understandable, Meltzer noted, when one
appreciates that it was enacted to curb hypertechnical vacaturs and reversals. See id.; see
also supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the historical
period in question). The full text of § 2111 is set forth in note 9, supra.
133. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 21. Meltzer also briefly considered and rejected a
second potential statutory argument—viz., that Chapman could be seen as necessary to
preserve the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review federal constitutional
rulings arising from the state courts. See id. at 21–23. The argument here would be that,
if states were permitted to adopt harmless-error statutes that too readily withhold
remedies for violations of federal constitutional rights, they effectively could insulate the
underlying constitutional rulings from Supreme Court review under the
independent-and-adequate state ground doctrine. See id. at 22. But as Meltzer observed,
the Court could stymie such a possibility simply by holding the state ground for denying
relief—i.e., harmlessness under a permissive state harmless-error statute—either
“inadequate” to foreclose Supreme Court review, see id. at 22, or tantamount to a denial of
state appellate review altogether, see id. at n.93. Either way, the Supreme Court then
would be free to review the merits of the state court’s federal constitutional ruling.
134. See id. at 1–26.
135. See id. at 26.
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or as applied.136 But I arrive at that conclusion through an
examination of how vacating or reversing a criminal judgment
functions as a remedy for a constitutional violation, and not
through an ontological analysis of the sort Meltzer conducted. 137
Still, because Meltzer’s analysis is persuasive and corroborative, I
precede my argument about what the Constitution requires with a
summary of his, deferring to the next subsection consideration of
Professor Richard M. Re’s recent argument that the Chapman
principle should be seen to originate in the due-process
guarantee. 138
The principal difficulty with any argument that the
Constitution requires reviewing courts to provide remedies for
constitutional errors not shown to have been harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt is that the Supreme Court repeatedly has
stated (albeit in dicta) that criminal defendants have no
constitutional right to an appeal. 139 For how can a remedy be
constitutionally obligatory if its means of delivery is a matter of
legislative grace? Meltzer first addresses whether these dicta are
correct through consideration of a range of arguments that have
been or could be made in favor of a constitutional right to an
appeal.
The conventional view that there is no constitutional right to
appeal a criminal judgment is grounded in the Constitution’s text
and history. The Constitution does not explicitly confer or
implicitly assume such a right, no such right existed in English
or colonial practice, and no such right was recognized in the
States at the time of the Founding. 140 Moreover, Congress
provided no right to appeal criminal judgments in the federal
courts when it enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789. 141 Indeed, it
was not until 1891 that Congress extended the right of appeal to
all federal criminal defendants. 142
136. See infra Part II.C. I also agree with Meltzer that the Chapman principle is best
viewed as constitutional common law. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
137. See infra Part II.C.
138. See Re, supra note 6, at 1914–16.
139. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 2 & nn.9–10 (collecting cases). Since Meltzer
published his article, the Supreme Court has continued to state that the federal
Constitution provides no right of appeal. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152,
160 (2000); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 119
(1995) (per curiam).
140. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 6 & nn.25–27 (collecting authority).
141. See id. at 6 & n.28 (citing David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History
of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 522, 556–59
(1990)).
142. See id. at 6 & n.29 (citing, inter alia, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517 § 5, 26 Stat.
827).
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Nevertheless, several writers have argued that a more
nuanced view of the history complicates any assertion that there
was no right to appeal a criminal judgment at common law. 143 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these writers point out,
many jurisdictions employed procedures that served some of the
functions of the modern appeal, including circuit riding,
post-conviction motions, trials before multi-judge panels,
executive and legislative review of criminal convictions, trial de
novo in a higher court, and (sometimes) review by means of a
writ of error. 144 But, as Meltzer notes, the most that can be said
of this history is that its existence complicates rejection of an
argument for a constitutional right to appeal a conviction purely
on the basis of history. The relevant history certainly does not
provide fertile soil for the advancement of such an argument. 145
Meltzer next addresses closely related arguments that
appeals have assumed such importance in American state and
federal criminal practice as to reflect a consensus that appellate
review of convictions is now constitutionally necessary, 146 and
that proper application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
calculus 147 reveals that a right to appeal a criminal conviction is
now an aspect of American procedural due process. 148 Meltzer
finds more force in these arguments than in any argument from
history. 149 Still, Meltzer observes, there are important
countervailing concerns 150 and very strong reasons to doubt that
today’s Supreme Court would find these arguments
persuasive. 151
At this point, Meltzer switches gears and assumes arguendo
that, notwithstanding what has just been said, there is a
constitutional right to appeal criminal judgments. He then
further assumes that this hypothetical right to appeal would
require the provision of a remedy in at least some class of cases
143. See id. at 7.
144. See id. at 7 & nn.31–36 (collecting authority).
145. Id. at 8.
146. See id.
147. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
148. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 8–9.
149. See id. at 9.
150. See id. at 9 n.45 (“The massive increase in appellate dockets in recent years
suggests that the institutional burden imposed by a constitutional right to appeal would
be . . . considerable” and that, therefore, “constitutionalizing a right to appeal might be
thought to give insufficient weight to the third Mathews factor, the burden imposed on the
government.”).
151. See id. at 9 n.46, (explaining why, based on his or her voting history, each
member of the 1994 Court would likely reject any argument that the Constitution confers
on criminal defendants a right to appeal).
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involving judgments marred by error. 152 Building from these
assumptions, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle
might be seen to operationalize such a right. He concludes, again
convincingly, that the Chapman principle cannot plausibly be so
characterized. For one thing, a right to reversal in certain
circumstances derived from a constitutional right to appeal a
criminal conviction seemingly would encompass any error that
might have led (or probably led, or almost certainly led, etc.) to
an erroneous conviction. But Chapman’s implicit promise of a
remedy for any error not shown to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt extends only to federal constitutional error, and
not to other outcome-affecting errors. 153
Moreover, acceptance of a constitutional right to appeal in
criminal cases cannot explain Chapman’s requirement that state
courts apply a federal harmless-error rule in deciding whether to
provide a remedy for a federal constitutional error at trial. At
most, such a right would promise an opportunity to challenge a
state criminal conviction in a state intermediate appellate court.
Assume that such a court, finding that federal constitutional
error had occurred at trial, ignores Chapman and applies a more
forgiving state harmless-error rule to affirm the conviction. The
federal right to appeal a conviction would have been observed in
such a situation, but not Chapman’s additional mandate that a
federal standard of review be applied to determine the
availability of a remedy. Thus, Chapman requires more of state
courts than vindication of any hypothetical federal constitutional
right to an appeal in criminal cases. 154
Having refuted the argument that the Chapman principle
derives from a hypothetical (although doubtful) federal
constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, Meltzer next
considers whether it can be explained by other constitutional
doctrines. Meltzer frames these arguments in terms of potential
constitutional limits on “state power” to adopt a harmless-error
principle other than Chapman, 155 but his responses to these
arguments also establish that there would be no constitutional
barrier to the adoption of a rule other than Chapman to govern
review of constitutional error at federal trials.
152. As Meltzer puts it, “Presumably, chief among the purposes of recognizing such a
right would be to reduce the likelihood that a defendant has been convicted at a trial that
violated his rights, constitutional or otherwise. To promote that purpose, an appeal must
promise reversal of the conviction in appropriate cases.” Id. at 10.
153. See id. at 10–11.
154. See id. at 11–12.
155. See id. at 12. Meltzer titles Part II of his article “Other Possible Constitutional
Limits on State Power to Treat Errors as Harmless.” Id.
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The first principle Meltzer evaluates is the Constitution’s
promise of equal protection in the provision of benefits that are
not themselves constitutionally required—viz., the principle that,
although the government need not provide criminal appeals, it
cannot, for example, restrict the right to appeal “to persons who
are white or Protestant or whose last names begin with Q.” 156 As
Meltzer demonstrates, the Chapman principle does not derive
from this equal protection principle. The adoption of a
harmless-error rule materially different and more permissive
than the one that Chapman prescribes—say, a rule that treats
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors (whether state or
federal) alike but permits courts to withhold remedies if they
conclude that that the error probably did not affect the
judgment—would not discriminate against either federal rights
in general or particular federal rights. Nor would such a rule
otherwise work a suspect classification. It therefore would not
conflict with equal protection principles, for it could hardly be
said to lack a rational basis. 157
Next, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle is
needed to avoid violating the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine—viz., the principle that makes it unconstitutional, for
example, for a state “to set up libraries restricted to Democratic
users” even though “a state need not establish public libraries at
all.” 158 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not require
the application of Chapman to constitutional trial errors. As
Meltzer puts it:
[T]o object that a state cannot condition its appeals on
enforcement of a harmless-error standard less favorable to
defendants than Chapman requires some independent
explanation of why the Constitution requires the Chapman
standard—an analogue to the First Amendment right of
library patrons not to belong to the Democratic party [in the
example recited above]. 159
Thus, any argument based on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine brings us back to the problem of independently
establishing a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
156. Id. (observing that this principle explains the Supreme Court’s holdings that
states may not constitutionally deny indigent appellants free transcripts, see Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956), or appointed counsel, see Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963), or the effective assistance of counsel on appeal, see Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985)).
157. See id. at 14.
158. Id. (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1421–28 (1989)).
159. Id. at 14–15.
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application of the Chapman principle on review of a
constitutional error committed at the defendant’s trial. 160
Finally, Meltzer considers whether the Chapman principle
might be tied to the rule of judicial integrity sometimes described
in terms of a court’s obligation to apply “all the relevant law,”
including the Constitution—an obligation that animated the
analysis in Marbury v. Madison. 161 Such an argument would
begin with the premise that appellate courts, like other courts
with jurisdiction over a case, are obliged to apply the
Constitution to the cases they adjudicate. It might then conclude
that application of the Constitution on appeal demands a remedy
for criminal convictions tainted by constitutional error unless the
requirements of the Chapman principle are satisfied. 162 Yet any
such argument runs up against (1) our history of regarding as
valid recognized limitations on the power of appellate courts to
consider only some of the issues presented in a given case, and
(2) our more general practice of permitting courts to withhold
remedies for past violations of constitutional rights. 163 So long as
we continue to accept the legitimacy of this firmly entrenched
history and these remedial customs, the Chapman principle
cannot be seen as a constitutional imperative that binds
reviewing courts to provide remedies for constitutional trial
errors unless the government has shown those errors to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 164
C. Constitutional Obligation: A Working Hypothesis & Response
to Professor Re
As noted in the previous subsection, Professor Meltzer’s
ontological analysis is convincing. Any claim that the Chapman
principle finds its roots in the Constitution is undercut by the
fact that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal
judgment—a point that the Supreme Court has continued to
160. Id. at 15. Any argument that Chapman is constitutionally compelled based on
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine also fails for a second reason: “Not all
constitutional rights are implicated in unconstitutional conditions cases. By its very
nature, the doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of
exercise of autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech,
exercise of religion[,] or privacy . . . .” Id. at 15 (quoting Sullivan, supra note 158, at 1426)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A more permissive harmless-error rule than
Chapman would not put pressure on a criminal defendant to forego the exercise of his or
her other constitutional rights. See id.
161. See id. at 15 (citing, inter alia, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177–78 (1803)).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 16–17.
164. See id.
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emphasize since Meltzer published his article 165—and the
additional fact that the Chapman principle cannot plausibly be
traced to any doctrine that constrains government in the
provision of constitutionally gratuitous benefits. Moreover, even
if there were a constitutional right to appeal a criminal
judgment, Chapman imposes obligations that make it impossible
to characterize the Chapman principle as a logical extension of
any such right.
But there is another path that leads to the conclusion that
the remedy implicitly promised by the Chapman principle—i.e.,
vacatur or reversal unless the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable
-doubt condition is satisfied—is not constitutionally compelled.
The alternative path looks to how that remedy typically
functions—viz., as a substitutionary remedy for the
constitutional deprivation worked during the judicial proceedings
that led to the claimant’s conviction. For substitutionary
constitutional remedies designed to ameliorate wholly concluded
constitutional wrongs, although critical tools for incentivizing
compliance with constitutional norms, are not themselves
constitutionally necessary.
In recent work, I have developed and defended this
argument, along with a corresponding claim that the
Constitution does require remedies for ongoing constitutional
injuries when relief is sought through justiciable and properly
preserved claims brought in proper forums. 166 This argument is
descriptive in its origins; it is rooted in the extant doctrines and
practices that combine to comprise the law of constitutional
remedies. 167 Yet the described reality—one that the Supreme
165. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
166. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 919–23; see also John M. Greabe, Constitutional
Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 892–96 (2013).
167. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 907–19; see also Greabe, supra note 166, at 863–92.
My descriptive approach to the problem of constitutionally compelled remedies tracked
that of Professors Fallon and Meltzer, who in 1991 published an influential article on the
same topic that argued: (1) there should be a strong but not always unyielding
presumption in favor of individually-effective relief for every constitutional violation; and
(2) there must exist a sufficient scheme of available remedies to ensure that constitutional
rights do not become nullities and that government officials remain answerable as a
systemic matter to the demands of the law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1787–91 (1991). Fallon and Meltzer explained that their aim in using a descriptive
approach, rather than seeking to develop a purely normative theory, was “to achieve
enhanced clarity of doctrinal understanding; we hope to further comprehension of what
courts have done and continue to do, and of the presuppositions that undergird their
pattern of decisions.” Id. at 1737. In building upon Fallon and Meltzer’s groundbreaking
work, I used the same approach because I too hoped to rationalize unexplained but
principled judicial behavior. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 859–60. I thus took the
remedial status quo as a given and did not seek to engage, for example, Professor John
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Court has never explicitly rationalized—is in fact also
normatively sensible. I will explain why shortly. But first, I
provide an overview of the different ways courts treat claims for
specific relief from ongoing constitutional injury and claims for
substitutionary relief for wholly concluded constitutional
violations.
In the context of constitutional litigation, specific remedies
typically enable a rightholder to halt an ongoing (or avoid an
imminent) deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest
protected by the Constitution. 168 In this way, they seek to provide
or restore to the rightholder the very same interest that the
Constitution protects. 169 Specific constitutional remedies include
rulings nullifying unconstitutional statutes or rules under which
coercive enforcement proceedings (such as criminal charges) are
brought; rulings enjoining such proceedings in circumstances
where the statute or rule authorizing the action cannot
constitutionally be applied on the facts of the case; injunctions
and declarations that operate to prohibit ongoing or imminent
rights violations other than unconstitutional enforcement
actions; the provision of access to a judicial officer through the
Great Writ of habeas corpus (so long as Congress has not
lawfully suspended its availability); just compensation for
takings; and make-whole relief for the coercive collection of
unconstitutional taxes, duties, or fees. 170
Substitutionary remedies, in contrast, provide “something
else” to the rightholder. 171 The quintessential substitutionary
remedy is a monetary damage award. In fact, remedies treatises
sometimes speak as though money is the only form of
Harrison’s originalist argument for a theory of constitutionally compelled remedies built
on the “private right” remedial framework that existed in the nineteenth century. See,
e.g., John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2516–17 (1998). For a fascinating exchange that captures the difference
between the Fallon/Meltzer approach and that of Professor Harrison, compare id., with
Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537,
2549–65 (1998).
168. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 905 & n.133 (citing Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a
“Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 126 (2006)). Of course, there are situations where
specific remedies only formally halt the ongoing constitutional deprivation by declaring it
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(reaffirming the unconstitutionality of separating students by race in public education but
requiring only that the defendant districts desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). In
such situations, the effects of the unconstitutional custom or policy at which the judgment
is directed may linger indefinitely.
169. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 905 & n.133.
170. See id. at 909–10; see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1990).
171. Greabe, supra note 8, at 905–06 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a “Specific” Remedy, 58 ALA. L. REV. 119, 126 (2006).
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substitutionary remedy. 172 And sure enough, courts do in fact
sometimes vindicate constitutional rights through monetary
damage awards. 173 But in the context of constitutional litigation,
two other substitutionary remedies are far more common. The
first is the exclusion of evidence at trial when the evidence was
obtained pursuant to a wholly concluded invasion of rights, such
as a search that violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights or an interrogation that violated the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights. 174 The second is the topic presently under
examination: the vacatur or reversal of a lower court judgment
when constitutional error—e.g., a failure to exclude evidence that
the Constitution prohibited the jury from hearing—occurred
during the judicial proceedings leading to the judgment. 175
Notice that there tends to be a fundamental difference
between the nature of the constitutional violations that ground
claims for specific remedies and that of the violations that ground
claims for substitutionary remedies. Situations permitting the
imposition of specific remedies typically involve challenges to
ongoing constitutional violations, which themselves are almost
always rooted in unconstitutional government policies or
customs—viz., unconstitutional statutes, rules, regulations,
practices, broadly applicable understandings, or the decisions of
those who function as government policymakers. 176 Situations
where only a substitutionary remedy is possible, in contrast,
usually involve the wholly completed, discretionary actions of
those persons to whom we necessarily entrust government power
172. See, e.g., JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 2.2 (2d ed. 2006);
ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 1 (7th ed.
2005) (“Substitutionary relief substitutes money for the specific relief.”).
173. Courts sometimes award monetary damages against individuals who have
misused federal power pursuant to the cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), and
against municipalities and individuals who have misused state power under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This complex area of law is summarized in Greabe, supra note 166, at 866–68,
881–84.
174. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 868–71, 884–85; see also Arnold H. Loewy,
Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 907–09
(1989).
175. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 871–72, 885–87; Ogletree, supra note 15, at 157.
176. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (addressing ongoing prison
population overcrowding with a court-mandated population limit). Consider the practical
barriers to getting to court to seek injunctive or declaratory relief responsive to an
imminent or ongoing invasion of rights by an individual government actor—e.g., a police
officer or prison guard—who is simply exercising the discretion required of all law
enforcement officers and cannot plausibly be characterized as administering a specific
custom or policy adopted by a government policymaker. For further discussion on specific
remedies, see Greabe, supra note 8, at 911–12.
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and ask that it be exercised according to constitutional norms in
variable and dynamic circumstances not specifically addressed by
an applicable custom or policy. 177
In the former context—that involving a challenge to a
facially unconstitutional “law” (broadly construing that term) or
a law that cannot constitutionally be applied in the
circumstances presented—the Supreme Court has regarded a
remedy precluding future application of the law as
constitutionally required so long as it is sought by means of a
justiciable and properly preserved claim brought in a proper
forum. 178 But in the latter context—that involving a post hoc
request for relief responsive to the completed, discretionary
conduct of one exercising government power with no concomitant
request that an unconstitutional law be enjoined—the Court has
authorized the withholding of remedies under doctrines such as
the qualified-immunity doctrine, exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, and (most pertinently) the various harmless-error principles
discussed above in Part II.A. 179
Although it has never so explained its actions, the Supreme
Court has behaved sensibly in treating specific remedies to
ameliorate ongoing constitutional violations—when sought by
means of justiciable and properly preserved claims asserted in
proper forums—as constitutionally necessary, while treating
substitutionary remedies responsive to wholly completed
constitutional wrongs as contingent and subject to being
withheld in circumstances where their negative effect on the
177. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395–97 (noting the availability of money damages
after unconstitutional arrest and search). For further discussion on substitutionary
remedies, see Greabe, supra note 8, at 910–11. The qualifier “usually” is necessary
because it is possible to experience a violation of one’s rights that, although concluded, is
rooted in an unconstitutional custom or policy that remains ongoing when a remedy is
sought. See id. at 911 n.155 (giving as examples claims addressed to wrongs rooted in an
unconstitutional municipal custom or policy or in an unconstitutional sentencing
guidelines regime). In such cases, the victim may seek both specific relief (a declaration
that invalidates the legal regime that authorized the wrong) and a substitutionary
remedy for the harm actually suffered.
178. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 917–19; see also, e.g., Plata, 563 U.S. at 526
(observing that it “would raise serious constitutional concerns” to read the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to foreclose a remedy for an ongoing unconstitutional prison
overcrowding (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986))); id. at 502, 545 (observing that the ongoing constitutional violation of prison
overcrowding “requires a remedy”).
179. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that
“government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
For further discussion on remedy-limiting doctrines, see Greabe, supra note 8, at
912–17.
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public interest would be too great. Specific remedies are more
directly rooted in the text and structure of the Constitution than
their substitutionary counterparts; they far more directly
operationalize claims brought to enforce structural values such
as federal supremacy, federalism, and the separation of federal
powers into three branches, including a judicial department
entrusted with judicial review. 180 Indeed, the Constitution
explicitly contemplates the specific remedies of access to a
judicial officer through the Great Writ of habeas corpus, 181 and
the provision of just compensation for a taking. 182 And the other
specific remedies responsive to constitutional violations 183 are
easily seen as constitutionally necessary when we recall that
they: (1) act to stop ongoing unconstitutional conduct at the
lawmaking level (where the effects of the unconstitutional law
are broadly applicable and likely to be experienced again and
again by others); and (2) therefore serve as the means by which
courts perform the quintessential function of judicial review,
which is to keep the coordinate federal branches and the States
within constitutional bounds. 184
In contrast, substitutionary remedies for constitutional
violations—money damage awards, the exclusion of evidence,
and the vacatur or reversal of judgments because of a
constitutional error at trial—lack any direct link to the text or
structure of the Constitution. It is for this reason that
substitutionary constitutional remedies are pervasively regarded
as products of subconstitutional common law lawmaking 185—at
least in circumstances where they are not statutorily
authorized. 186 By their very nature, they provide less narrowly
tailored relief than specific remedies deliver, for they fail to
prevent, halt, or undo the constitutional violations to which they
respond. 187 Moreover, they frequently engender significant and
controversial costs that third parties who were not directly
involved in the right-violating event must bear. 188 To be sure,
180. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 921.
181. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
182. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
184. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 922 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 163, 177 (1803)).
185. See id. at 920 n.197 (collecting authority); see also Meltzer, supra note 8, at 26.
186. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing monetary damage awards for
constitutional violations).
187. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 920–21; cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
141 (2009) (noting the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in deterring Fourth Amendment
violations in the future).
188. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 921 (citing People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587
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substitutionary constitutional remedies are crucial mechanisms
for ensuring adherence to constitutional norms; eliminating them
without replacing them with effective alternatives would invite
too much underenforcement of constitutional norms. But while
they are integral to our constitutional order as a class, they also
are properly regarded as individually contingent and susceptible
to legislative or judicial expansion, contraction, or replacement as
the perceived public interest dictates. 189
The functional analysis I have just summarized brings us,
with an important qualification, 190 to the same conclusion
reached by Professor Meltzer—viz., that the Chapman principle’s
implicit promise of relief in cases where the government fails to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the harmlessness of a
constitutional trial error does not deliver a constitutionally
compelled remedy. This conclusion (as qualified) serves as the
foundational hypothesis for the rest of the paper. For if we accept
that the Constitution ordinarily imposes no barrier to reform, we
can proceed to consider whether the doctrines governing
harmless-error review might in fact beneficially be reformed, and
the paths any such reforms might take. Parts III and IV take up
these questions. But before moving on, I address an argument
that, if accepted, would undermine my hypothesis and preclude
reform efforts of the type I propose.
Obviously, my hypothesis is built from a characterization of
appeals and habeas petitions challenging constitutional trial
(N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered.”)).
189. See Greabe, supra note 166, at 893; see also Meltzer, supra note 167, at 2564–65
(noting that many of the concerns about negative effects on the public interest raised by
actions for substitutionary relief against individual officers are not present in lawsuits to
enjoin ongoing unconstitutional practices that might affect large numbers of individuals).
190. The qualification is that, when the claim is for specific relief from the ongoing
application of a criminal statute that is facially unconstitutional or cannot
constitutionally be applied, the reviewing court must afford relief. It is widely recognized
that, when a court has jurisdiction and is faced with a justiciable, properly preserved, and
meritorious claim of this sort, a remedy is constitutionally necessary. See, e.g., RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 718 (6th ed. 2009); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1391–92 (2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
treated the obligation to provide relief responsive to this sort of claim as so obvious that it
does not even list a trial court’s failure to dismiss a prosecution brought pursuant to a
facially unconstitutional law (or to a law that cannot constitutionally be applied) as
“structural” error. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. Rather, it simply
provides relief without any further consideration of whether it should withhold a remedy
under harmless-error doctrine. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003)
(reversing conviction based on facial unconstitutionality of statute under which
prosecution was brought); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2093–94 (2014)
(reversing conviction because criminal statute could not constitutionally be applied on the
facts of the case).
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errors committed by judges and prosecutors—other than review
of the erroneous failure to dismiss a prosecution brought on the
basis of a facially unconstitutional statute or a statute that
cannot constitutionally be applied 191—as involving claims for a
substitutionary remedy (the vacation or reversal of a judgment of
conviction) responsive to isolated and wholly concluded
constitutional wrongs (e.g., the admission of evidence that should
have been excluded under the Self-Incrimination or
Confrontation Clauses). But in a recent article, Professor Richard
M. Re proposes a different characterization of the harm done
when evidence is unconstitutionally admitted or excluded at
trial. 192 Re argues that, when a judgment of conviction is entered
at the conclusion of a criminal trial marred by an
unconstitutional evidentiary ruling, a second constitutional
violation takes place—a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty
without due process. 193 What’s more, this second constitutional
violation is ongoing from the moment the judgment of conviction
is entered, and it requires a remedy as a matter of constitutional
law when brought to the attention of a reviewing court unless the
government is able to show that admission of the evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 194 In other words, the
Chapman principle’s implicit promise of relief unless the
government establishes harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt
delivers a constitutionally compelled remedy responsive to an
ongoing deprivation of the defendant’s due process right not to be
convicted at a trial where evidence that might have played a role
in the decision to convict was unconstitutionally admitted. 195
Re’s call for recognition of such a due process right will be
attractive to many who are concerned about the Supreme Court’s
recent expansion of remedy-withholding doctrines such as
qualified immunity, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and
harmless error. 196 But it is difficult to reconcile with the doctrines
and practices that, at present, constitute the law of constitutional
remedies. Most basically, such a right could be enforced only by
means of a procedural mechanism that the Supreme Court
191. See supra note 190.
192. See Re, supra note 6, at 1912. In the article, Re’s principal purpose is to argue
that the Constitution’s due process clauses require the exclusion at trial of evidence
obtained pursuant to searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment. See id.
at 1887. I do not here engage this interesting and well-developed argument. Rather, I
address only Re’s comparatively brief suggestion that the due process clauses also require
appellate courts to apply the Chapman principle.
193. See id. at 1912.
194. See id. at 1915–17.
195. See id.
196. I count myself among their ranks. See Greabe, supra note 8, at 926–27.
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repeatedly has said is not constitutionally required—namely,
appeal from a criminal judgment. 197 Therefore, Re either must
provide a reason why the Supreme Court’s statements are wrong,
or locate the right within some doctrine that places constitutional
limits on the provision of constitutionally gratuitous
procedures. 198 Otherwise, the right would be singular among
criminal constitutional trial rights in that there would be no
constitutionally required process for its vindication. This would
be powerful evidence of its nonexistence, given our constitutional
commitment to requiring some procedural means for
ameliorating
an
ongoing,
individualized
violation
of
199
constitutional rights.
There are other reasons to doubt that one convicted at a trial
in which material evidence was unconstitutionally admitted or
excluded is suffering an ongoing constitutional violation separate
and apart from the underlying admission or exclusion of
evidence. The appellate judgment call that vindication of the
right would entail only rarely would curb further application of a
broadly applicable unconstitutional custom or policy that, if left
unchecked, might potentially also deprive others of their
rights. 200 Rather, in most cases, such a judgment call simply
would require an appellate court to decide on a unique set of facts
whether the trial judge incorrectly failed to enforce a
constitutional boundary and, if so, whether the trial judge’s error
was harmless. 201 And the underlying trial court ruling—which at
bottom is the constitutional actus reus that Re’s due-process
theory targets—is a quintessentially discretionary, point-in-time
judgment call of a type that, if deemed erroneous by a reviewing
court, does not require the provision of a remedy as a matter of
constitutional law. 202 Although the effects of such mistakes
undoubtedly persist, we do not conceptualize the violations
themselves as ongoing. We do not, in other words, understand
the Constitution to promise a right to be free from detention after
a trial in which ontologically “unconstitutional” evidentiary
rulings have been handed down. Rather, we understand the
Constitution to promise only a right to a trial in which an

197. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 156–164 and accompanying text. Re does not argue that there is
a constitutional right to appeal or suggest that there is another ground for
constitutionalizing the Chapman principle notwithstanding the absence of such a right.
199. See supra notes 178, 180–184.
200. See supra notes 177, 183–184 and accompanying text.
201. See id.
202. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
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unbiased and duly appointed judge will rule on constitutional
challenges as they are raised.
Finally, prevailing principles governing the provision of
remedies on collateral review are inconsistent with the argument
that a person convicted of a crime after a material and
constitutionally erroneous evidentiary ruling endures a separate,
ongoing constitutional violation. A habeas court that disagrees
with a state appeals court’s determination that a constitutional
trial error was harmless under Chapman does not simply grant
the writ; rather, the court is under a mandate to accord an extra
measure of deference and withhold a remedy unless the state
appeals court’s Chapman ruling was itself patently
unreasonable. 203 Such a remedy-withholding principle would not
be possible if a habeas applicant with a meritorious claim that a
state appellate court misapplied Chapman was seen to be
presenting a claim for specific relief directed at an ongoing
constitutional wrong—at least so long as courts continue to
regard a remedy as constitutionally obligatory in such
circumstances. 204 We should be reluctant to begin recognizing
exceptions to this foundational principle of constitutional
remedies.
III. ASSESSING THE STATUS QUO: A NEED FOR REFORM
The Supreme Court’s major harmless-error decisions have
not been models of clarity. As we have seen, Kotteakos suggested
without explanation that its elaboration of how to apply the
federal harmless-error statute would “perhaps” not apply to
constitutional error even though the statute did not distinguish
between constitutional and nonconstitutional error. 205 Moreover,
Chapman did not specify the source of the authority by which it
203. See supra notes 100–106.
204. That courts do regard a remedy as obligatory when an applicant for habeas
relief presents a justiciable and properly preserved claim for relief directed at an ongoing
constitutional violation may be seen in the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion—which has subsequently been treated by the
Court as controlling, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 190, at 1242, requires a habeas court
to provide a remedy when the Supreme Court issues a “new rule” that makes previously
punishable conduct constitutionally protected. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307–10 (O’Connor,
J., plurality opinion). This rule operationalizes the promise of relief for a truly ongoing
constitutional violation in a context—collateral review—that is otherwise quite
begrudging with respect to remedies.
205. See supra notes 30, 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing Kotteakos and
setting forth the text of the federal harmless-error statute at the time Kotteakos was
decided). Kotteakos also failed to explain why the error it was reviewing—a variance
between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracies proved at trial—
was not of constitutional dimension.
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imposed its holding on state courts. 206 And as we shall see,
Fulminante adopted a jurisprudence of easily manipulated
labels, Brecht recast Kotteakos in terms that bear little
resemblance to the original, and the Court’s more recent
decisions about application of harmless-error analysis on
collateral review appear to be animated more by a hostility
towards collateral relief than a commitment to the principled
application of precedent. Given this history, it is not surprising
that the present state of harmless-error doctrine is
unsatisfactory. This Part provides a critique of current doctrine
that sets the stage for the reforms advocated in Part III.
A. The “Privileging” of Constitutional Error
In Chapman, the Supreme Court tacitly decided to
“privilege” constitutional trial errors over nonconstitutional trial
errors. 207 It did so by instructing appellate courts to apply a
stricter, “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard—rather
than the more forgiving Kotteakos “substantial and injurious
effect or influence” standard (which the Chapman majority did
not discuss)—in evaluating the harmlessness of constitutional
trial errors. 208 The Court took this action even though the federal
harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, draws no distinction
between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors. 209
The Court has never attempted to rationalize its practice of
privileging constitutional errors in the context of harmless-error
review. The Court has not suggested, for example, that it
requires constitutional privileging because it views parties
challenging convictions as private attorneys general who help
secure compliance with constitutional norms by judges and
206. See supra Part II.B.
207. I am indebted to Professor Michael Coenen for the term “constitutional
privileging.” See Coenen, supra note 11. Coenen’s article presents a powerful,
transcontextual argument urging skepticism towards constitutional privileging. Coenen
considered and found wanting a number of arguments that might be made in favor of the
practice based on either the perceived intrinsic preeminence of constitutional law, see id.
at 712, or, alternatively, possible extrinsic reasons for treating constitutional law as
preeminent. See id. at 728–29. Coenen argued that one of the doctrinal areas that would
benefit from elimination of constitutional privileging is harmless-error review. See id. at
741. I fully agree and, in Part IV, propose a reformed approach to harmless-error review
that would eliminate the practice.
208. See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.
209. The statutory predecessor to § 2111, 28 U.S.C. § 391, stated that courts should
disregard “technical” errors that did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Act of
Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62
Stat. 892, 998. But there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended the statutory
reference to “technical” errors to differentiate between constitutional and
nonconstitutional errors.
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prosecutors. 210 Rather, the Court appears simply to have
assumed that mistakes of constitutional dimension are somehow
more likely to have compromised the accuracy of the verdict than
nonconstitutional errors. The assumption is unwarranted.
To understand why, consider the following passage from
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Webster v. Doe. 211 Webster
adopted constitutional privileging in a different context; it held
that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, termination
decisions by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the National Security Act of 1947 were subject to
constitutional but not statutory challenges. 212 But Justice
Scalia’s dissenting argument makes a point that also rings true
with respect to constitutional and nonconstitutional trial errors:
Perhaps . . . a constitutional right is by its nature so much
more important to the claimant than a statutory right that
a statute which plainly excludes the latter [from judicial
review] should not be read to exclude the former unless it
says so. That principle has never been announced—and
with good reason, because its premise is not true. An
individual’s contention that the Government has reneged
upon a $100,000 debt owing under a contract is much more
important to him—both financially and, I suspect, in the
sense of injustice that he feels—than the same individual’s
claim that a particular federal licensing provision requiring
a $100 license denies him equal protection of the laws, or
that a particular state tax violates the Commerce Clause. A
citizen would much rather have his statutory entitlement
correctly acknowledged after a constitutionally inadequate
hearing, than have it incorrectly denied after a proceeding
that fulfills all the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. 213
So too with persons who were convicted after criminal trials that
were marred by error. Surely, at least in ordinary circumstances,
such persons are unlikely to care particularly about whether the
error was rooted in the Constitution, a statute, or a rule of
evidence or criminal procedure. Rather, the principal concern will

210. Compare, in this respect, the deterrence rationale underlying the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426
(2011) (“The [exclusionary] rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future
Fourth Amendment violations.”). For criticism of the Court’s single-minded focus on the
accuracy of convictions in developing a harmless-error jurisprudence, see infra note 324.
211. 486 U.S. 592, 606–21(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 594 (discussing the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)
(1982) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2012)).
213. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be with the error’s likely prejudicial effect—i.e., how likely it is
that the error played some role in the decision to convict.
Consider, for example, a criminal defendant whose federal
jury trial on an indictment charging that he was a felon in
possession of a firearm 214 ends in conviction after the trial judge
has committed two separate errors. First, the judge erroneously
admitted into evidence, over the defendant’s objection, a Trace
Summary authored by an unknown employee of the federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives that
tended to show that the firearm had traveled in interstate
commerce. Admitting such evidence in this way violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. 215 Second,
the judge, again over the defendant’s objection, permitted the
prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s extensive
criminal history and to argue that such evidence tended to show
both the defendant’s bad character and the likelihood that he
had committed the crime with which he was charged in
accordance with that bad character, in violation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, rule 404(b)(1). 216
Suppose further that, at trial, the defendant never contested
the fact that the firearm in question had moved in interstate
commerce. Rather, his defense was that the firearm had been
planted on him and that he therefore had not knowingly
possessed it. In such a situation, the defendant is going to be far
more concerned about the Rule 404(b)(1) error than the
Confrontation Clause error. Quite clearly, the Rule 404(b)(1)
error is far more likely to have played a role in the jury’s decision
to convict. And yet, harmless-error principles instruct reviewing
courts to be more parsimonious in providing a remedy for the
Rule 404(b)(1) error. This makes no sense, particularly in view of
the fact that the principles governing harmless-error review have
never been justified in terms other than an error’s putative effect
on the verdict. 217
214. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to knowingly possess a firearm
that has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.
215. See United States v. Roberts, 419 F. App’x 155, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
that the admission of a Trace Summary in such circumstances violates the Confrontation
Clause).
216. Rule 404(b)(1) states: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.”
217. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD.
161, 172 (2001) (criticizing application of a stricter harmless-error test for constitutional
errors on the ground that there is no basis for regarding constitutional errors as
categorically more serious than nonconstitutional errors); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 1,
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There also are practical reasons to view skeptically the
efficacy of the mandate that constitutional trial errors be
assessed under the “stringent” Chapman principle while
nonconstitutional errors be evaluated under the “less onerous”
Kotteakos standard. 218 Some of our most respected judges have
opined that relatively slight variations in standards of review do
not actually affect the outcomes of judicial decisions. 219 In this
respect, reread the explanation of how to apply the federal
harmless-error statute Justice Rutledge provided in Kotteakos, 220
compare it with the harmless-error analysis Justice Black
prescribed in Chapman, 221 and consider whether a faithful
application of these supposedly distinct standards would lead to
different outcomes in a nonnegligible number of cases. 222 Many
at 48–49 (lamenting the complications caused by different tests for evaluating
constitutional and nonconstitutional error and opining that a properly formulated and
calibrated unitary test would naturally take into account the nature of the error in
assessing whether it required a remedy).
218. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Lombard, 102 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1996) (opinion of
Boudin, Cir. J.) (expressing doubt that case outcomes are much affected by the imposition
of a “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than a “preponderance of the evidence,”
standard of proof); Richard A. Posner, Comment on Professor Gluck’s “Imperfect Statutes,
Imperfect Courts”, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 14 (2015) (stating that, although appellate
courts and law professors are forever “complexifying” law by purporting to apply a
number of different standards of appellate review, “the only real as opposed to nominal
difference is between plenary review, of pure issues of law, and mildly deferential review,
of findings of fact and applications of legal doctrines to facts found by the lower court or
agency”); cf. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 643 (2015) (detailing how judges and their law clerks frequently confuse or
ignore the “deference regime”—i.e., the standard of review or burden of proof that governs
a case—of a given precedent and then proceed to misapply the precedent in a different
context).
220. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that an error is to be
disregarded if “the conviction is sure that [it] did not influence the jury,” but should not be
disregarded “if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error” or “if one is left in grave doubt” whether the error “had
substantial influence”).
221. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (stating that the error should not
be disregarded if “there is a reasonable possibility that [it] might have contributed to the
verdict” or if the reviewing court cannot “declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
222. The Court’s use of the descriptor “stringent” in connection with the Chapman
principle and “less onerous” in connection with the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard—provided
as they were in the context of adopting a laxer standard for review of constitutional error
on collateral review, see supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text—may well have been
intended to signal lower courts to operationalize harmless-error review on habeas in a far
more lenient manner than a fair reading of Kotteakos would imply. Certainly, the Court’s
subsequent treatment of the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard on collateral review strongly
suggests just such an intention. See infra Part II.C. But this only highlights another
problem with the status quo of harmless-error review: that precedent is not to be taken at
face value.
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commentators—including two Supreme Court Justices—have
said that the answer is “no.” 223 In fact, even within the more
demanding realm of Chapman (and therefore certainly within
the more lenient realm of Kotteakos), there is a pervasive sense
that, too often, only one thing really matters to most judges and
clerks when they read trial court records to assess whether an
error was harmless: the strength of the evidence of guilt. As
Anthony Amsterdam has put it:
In theory, the standard by which appellate courts are
supposed to test the harmlessness of most constitutional
errors in the pretrial process and at trial is whether the
judges are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the guilty verdict or the
sentence. But in practice, it much more often boils down to
whether the appellate judges think that the prosecution’s
evidence of guilt was potent and the sentence well deserved.
. . . When appellate judges decide to reject a claim of
error on harmless-error grounds, they very often do not say
anything at all about the claim in their opinion. When they
do say that the claim has been considered and rejected on
harmless-error grounds, their explanation for why they
regard any possible error as harmless is ordinarily brief
and unrevealing, often conclusionary, almost always
immune to criticism or review because it is case-specific
and therefore opaque to anyone not thoroughly familiar
with the record of the particular case.224

Finally, there are grounds for questioning whether a
violation of positive law occurring during the proceedings leading
223. Judge Harry T. Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has stated that it is hard to discern any material difference between the
Chapman principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is
Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1167, 1179 (1995); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86–87
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the difference between the Chapman
principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111 standard involves an “ineffable gradation[] of
probability” that is “quite beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp,
and thus [is] harmful rather than helpful to the consistency and rationality of judicial
decisionmaking”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the demanding nature of the Kotteakos/§ 2111 inquiry and
stating that the difference between the Chapman principle and the Kotteakos/§ 2111
standard is “less significant than it might seem”); Poulin, supra note 70, at 1013–15
(convincingly denouncing the impossibly fine and meaningless distinctions among the
Supreme Court’s various tests for harm in criminal cases).
224. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2004) (footnotes omitted). Professor Amsterdam’s sense of
how harmless-error review often proceeds in practice accords with my own, based on my
thirteen years as a career law clerk to three different federal appeals court judges.
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to a criminal conviction—e.g., the admission of evidence that
should have been excluded under the Federal Rules Evidence,
rule 404(b)(1) in the hypothetical posited earlier in this
subsection—ever should be regarded as “nonconstitutional” error.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent reluctance to
ascribe constitutional significance to violations of state and
nonconstitutional federal law, many experts believe that the
Constitution’s due process clauses originally were understood to
require adherence to all positive-law procedural rules applicable
at criminal trials—or at least all positive-law procedural rules
that function as part of the process for obtaining criminal
convictions. 225 And, of course, original meaning is dispositive for
a number of members of the Court when it comes to setting the
metes and bounds of the due-process guarantee. 226
The scope of due process is one of the most contested topics
in constitutional law, and there is no need to enter into the
debate for present purposes. It is enough to say that the Court’s
use on direct review of two putatively different standards for
assessing the harmlessness of violations of positive law at trial—
one applicable to “constitutional” violations and the other
applicable to “nonconstitutional” error—almost certainly implies
more about the nature of due process than some members of the
Court intend to say. For this additional reason, it is time for the
Court to stop differentiating between constitutional and
nonconstitutional error in its harmless-error doctrines.
B. The Structural Defect/Trial Error Dichotomy
In Fulminante, the Supreme Court differentiated between a
default category of “trial errors” amenable to harmless-error
review and what has turned out to be a very small category of
“structural defects” that require vacation or reversal of the
affected conviction when it is challenged on direct review. 227
Subsequently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court
described the latter category of error as one with effects that bear

225. See Re, supra note 6, at 1939–42 (citing, inter alia, Nathan S. Chapman &
Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L. J. 1672,
1679 (2012); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 420–21 (2010); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 497 (1997); Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due
Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 343 (1987)).
226. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
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“directly” on “the framework within which the trial proceeds.” 228
But whether the Court believes that an error bears with
sufficient directness on the trial framework to qualify as
“structural” has proved to be no more predictable than whether
the pre-1937 Court thought that activity bore with sufficient
directness on interstate commerce to bring it within Congress’s
regulatory power. 229 In other words, the Court’s trial
error/structural defect dichotomy has generated a results-driven
jurisprudence of labels.
There is no shortage of criticism of the Fulminante
framework, 230 so I will not dwell on the subject at length.
Instead, I will illustrate the unsatisfactory state of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area by discussing the incoherent manner
in which the Court has dealt with the questions of whether and
how reviewing courts should review for harmlessness jury
instructions that inaccurately describe, or fail to describe
altogether, an element of a charged offense (instructions
containing “elemental misdescriptions” or “elemental omissions”),
or that direct the jury to presume that an element of the charged
offense has been established by the trial evidence once it has
found certain predicate facts (instructions setting up “mandatory
presumptions”). 231 Such instructions have the effect of permitting
the jury to convict without having found each element of the
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Sixth
Amendment jury-trial right and due process require. 232
228. 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995) (describing how, in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–38 (1937), the Court “departed
from the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on interstate commerce” in favor
of a more realistic analysis that asked whether regulated activities “have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions”).
230. See supra note 15.
231. This terrain is covered in far more detail in Fairfax, supra note 15, at 2040–51,
and Greabe, supra note 26, at 830–44.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (noting the
unconstitutionality of jury instructions that fail to require the jury to find an element of the
crime charged); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979) (holding
unconstitutional jury instructions that direct the jury to presume an element of the crime
charged upon finding certain predicate facts regardless whether the presumption is
conclusive or rebuttable); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that “the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
An instruction setting up a conclusive (rather than a rebuttable) mandatory presumption—
i.e., an instruction that requires the jury to make an elemental determination upon finding
certain predicate facts—is unconstitutional for a second reason as well. It invades the jury’s
province by deterring it from considering any evidence relevant to the issue as to which the
presumption is established but not relevant to the predicate factual findings that serve to
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On the one hand, the Court has long emphasized that a
reviewing court should respect the jury’s role as the fact finder
and not hold an error harmless on the ground that it would have
convicted had it been empaneled as the jury at the defendant’s
trial. 233 This is why, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Court held that
an inaccurate reasonable-doubt instruction is a structural defect
impervious to harmless-error review. 234 The question is not
“whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable
to the error.” 235 Yet this is a meaningless question where the
guilty verdict is based on an inaccurate instruction from the trial
judge on the standard by which the jury is to judge guilt:
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable
-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty
beyond a reasonable-doubt would have been rendered
absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless.
There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless-error
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can
conclude is that a jury would surely have found the
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—not that the
jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error. That is not enough. The Sixth
Amendment requires more than appellate speculation
about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts
for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an
actual jury finding of guilty. 236
If the Court were to apply this same line of reasoning to jury
instructions containing elemental misdescriptions or omissions,
and to jury instructions setting up mandatory presumptions, it
would be compelled to conclude that such instructions also give
rise to structural defects—at least in ordinary trial
circumstances. After all, just like a defective reasonable doubt
instruction, such an instruction ordinarily precludes the jury
from returning a complete verdict rendered according to proper
legal standards. The qualification “ordinarily” is necessary,
however, because there might be situations where the improper
trigger the presumption. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84–88 (1983) (plurality
opinion).
233. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946) (“[T]he question
is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a
jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials . . . .”).
234. 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993).
235. Id. at 279 (emphasis omitted).
236. Id. at 280 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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instruction pertained only to an element of a crime of which the
defendant was acquitted, where the defendant admitted to the
element of the offense that was the subject of the improper
instruction, or where the jury (after otherwise being properly
instructed) made some other finding that necessarily also implied
the “missing” finding. And, indeed, in Carella v. California, four
members of the Court proposed that just such a three-part test be
applied in reviewing for harmlessness jury instructions
containing elemental misdescriptions or omissions, or setting up
mandatory presumptions. 237
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has resisted the logic
of the argument described in the preceding two paragraphs and
instead treated such instructions as giving rise to run-of-the-mill
trial errors. In 1986, in Rose v. Clark, the Court held that jury
instructions containing rebuttable mandatory presumptions are
subject to ordinary harmless-error review. 238 In 1987, in Pope v.
Illinois, the Court extended the holding of Rose to jury
instructions containing elemental misdescriptions. 239 And in
1989, in Carella, the Court extended the holding of Rose to jury
instructions containing conclusive mandatory presumptions. 240
In all three cases, the Court avoided discussion of the tension
between the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee and
application of harmless-error review to instructions containing
errors which permit the jury to convict without actually having
found each element of the offense charged—or without actually
having made other findings that necessarily implied the missing
finding—under the appropriate standard of proof. 241
237. See 491 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun).
238. 478 U.S. 570, 579–82 (1986) (implicitly rejecting the Court’s plurality opinion in
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), in which the Court had held that a conclusive
mandatory presumption can only be harmless if the defendant was acquitted of the
charge in question or if the defendant affirmatively conceded the issue on which the
presumption was established). In 1991, in Yates v. Evatt, the Court followed Rose and
reiterated that a rebuttable mandatory presumption may be harmless. See 500 U.S. 391,
402–11 (1991) (conducting harmless-error review and concluding that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
239. See 481 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1987).
240. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1989) (per curiam).
241. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 580–84 (stating that an instruction setting up a rebuttable
mandatory presumption if the jury finds certain predicate facts may be harmless because
the jury must still find the predicate facts and in many cases those predicate facts will
conclusively establish the presumed element so that no rational jury could find the
predicate facts without also finding the presumed element); Pope, 481 U.S. at 501–04
(stating that an instruction misdescribing an element of the offense may be harmless
because the jury must still find the misdescribed element and it is possible that the
tainted finding might conclusively establish the missing finding); Carella, 491 U.S. at
266–67 (stating that an instruction setting up a conclusive mandatory presumption if the
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Finally, in 1999, the issue came to a head in Neder v. United
States. 242 In Neder, the defendant was charged with a number of
offenses including filing false income tax returns in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 243 The district court, following then-binding
circuit precedent, erroneously failed to instruct the jury to decide
whether the false statements in the returns were material. 244
The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the district
court’s mistake gave rise to a structural defect because it
deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment jury-trial right
in circumstances where he was not acquitted of the offense,
where he did not admit materiality, and where the jury did not
make other findings that necessarily implied a finding of
materiality. 245 The Court then held that this elemental omission
was harmless error because the evidence of materiality was
overwhelming and uncontested. 246
In reaching this holding, the Court relied on Rose and its
progeny which, as we have seen, held that appellate courts
should conduct harmless-error review of instructional errors that
have the effect of causing the jury not to make formally proper
findings on each element of the offense charged. 247 The Court
also explicitly distanced itself from the analysis in Sullivan
described in detail above. 248 Instead, the Court narrowed
Sullivan by stating that a mistaken reasonable doubt instruction
gives rise to a structural defect only because it “vitiates all the

jury finds certain facts may be harmless because the jury must still find the predicate
facts and in many cases those predicate facts will conclusively establish the presumed
element). Rose alternatively suggested that “the jury would have found it unnecessary to
rely on the presumption” because of overwhelming evidence of the missing element, and
that such evidence also rendered the error harmless. See 478 U.S. at 583 (quoting
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 97 n.5 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)). But in Yates,
the Court rejected this alternative line of reasoning and admonished reviewing courts
that harmless-error review of instructions setting up rebuttable mandatory presumptions
involves more than mere appellate inquiry into what a properly instructed jury likely
would have concluded. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406–07 & n.11 (1991). As we
shall see momentarily, however, the Court subsequently retreated from the more
demanding analysis it insisted upon in Yates. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying
text.
242. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
243. See id. at 6.
244. See id. at 6–7 (noting that the trial took place before the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), which held that materiality in
such cases must be determined by the jury).
245. See id. at 13–14.
246. See id. at 15–20.
247. See id. at 9–15.
248. See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text.
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jury’s findings and produces consequences that are necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminate.” 249
The Court did not explicitly concede that its adoption of an
“overwhelming evidence” test to govern review of elemental
omissions was in logical conflict with another recent Court
precedent. 250 Nor did it formally acknowledge that it was
retreating from the Bollenbach principle. 251 But, in response to
Justice Scalia’s blistering separate opinion, 252 the Court all but
admitted that its holding was outside the logic of its
harmless-error precedents:
It would not be illogical to extend the reasoning of Sullivan
from a defective “reasonable doubt” instruction to a failure
to instruct on an element of the crime. But, as indicated in
the foregoing discussion [of Rose and its progeny], the
matter is not res nova under our case law. And if the life of
the law has not been logic but experience, see O. Holmes,
The Common Law 1 (1881), we are entitled to stand back
and see what would be accomplished by such an extension
in this case. The omitted element was materiality.
Petitioner underreported $5 million on his tax returns, and
did not contest the element of materiality at trial.
Petitioner does not suggest that he would introduce any
evidence bearing upon the issue of materiality if so allowed.
Reversal without any consideration of the effect of the error
upon the verdict would send the case back for retrial—a
retrial not focused at all on the issue of materiality, but on
contested issues on which the jury was properly instructed.
We do not think the Sixth Amendment requires us to veer
away from settled precedent to reach such a result. 253
This is a remarkable paragraph. On the surface, the Court’s
appeal to pragmatism is attractive. Remanding for a retrial in
the circumstances described would seem to be the epitome of a
mindless, logical formalism. But the passage ignores that the
then newly minted legal regime the Court created in Fulminante
to govern whether constitutional trial error is amenable to

249. Neder, 527 U.S. at 10–11 (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).
250. See supra note 241 (discussing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 406–07 & n.11
(1991)).
251. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
252. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 30–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (endorsing Sullivan, of which he was the author, in very strong terms). Justices
Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. Justice Stevens also wrote
separately and disagreed with the majority’s harmless-error analysis. See id. 25–27
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
253. Id. at 15.
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harmless-error review 254 calls for a logical and formalist analysis,
and not a pragmatic and realistic one. Fulminante instructs that
errors causing structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism defy analysis by harmless-error standards and
require automatic reversal. 255 And Sullivan instructs that a
verdict from a properly instructed jury is essential to the
constitution of the trial mechanism within the meaning of
Fulminante. 256 If the Neder majority thought the Fulminante
regime to be too constraining, it should have said so explicitly. It
should not have pretended that its decision was consistent with
that regime. The Fulminante framework, like the Chapman
principle that it serves to elaborate, is constitutional common
law. 257 And as with other common law doctrines, it should
explicitly evolve if and when its shortcomings become apparent.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Alito authored a
dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, in which he sought to recast Fulminante
in a way that would make the Neder decision more defensible
when viewed in the light of Fulminante and Sullivan. 258 Justice
Alito wrote:
The majority’s focus on the “trial error”/“structural defect”
dichotomy is misleading. In Fulminante, we used these
terms to denote two poles of constitutional error that had
appeared in prior cases; trial errors always lead to
harmless-error review, while structural errors always lead
to automatic reversal. We did not suggest that trial errors
are the only sorts of errors amenable to harmless-error
review, or that all errors affecting the framework within
which the trial proceeds are structural. The touchstone of
structural error is fundamental unfairness and
unreliability. Automatic reversal is strong medicine that
should be reserved for constitutional errors that always or
necessarily produce such unfairness. 259
The majority responded by stating:
The dissent criticizes us for our trial error/structural defect
dichotomy, asserting that Fulminante never said that trial
254. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–12 (1991). Note that Neder was
decided in 1999 and Fulminante was decided in 1991. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored
each opinion.
255. Id. at 309–10.
256. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993).
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (holding that denial of counsel of one’s choice is
structural error not subject to review for harmlessness).
259. Id. at 159 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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errors are the only sorts of errors amenable to
harmless-error review, or that all errors affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds are structural.
Although it is hard to read that case as doing anything
other than dividing constitutional error into two
comprehensive categories, our ensuing analysis in fact
relies neither upon such comprehensiveness nor upon trial
error as the touchstone for the availability of
harmless-error review. Rather, here, as we have done in the
past, we rest our conclusion of structural error upon the
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.260

The majority is correct; it is difficult to read Fulminante in
the manner proposed by the Gonzalez-Lopez dissent. And yet, the
dissent’s impulse to abandon the formalistic Fulminante
framework is sound. The costs of applying the Fulminante
framework rigorously and faithfully are simply too high to
bear. 261 Moreover, commentators have persuasively argued,
Fulminante’s requirement that structural errors be automatically
reversed has had the negative collateral consequence of causing
lower courts to define structural rights too narrowly. 262 The
Court therefore should abandon the Fulminante framework in
favor of a more realistic and pragmatic approach to
harmless-error review. But it should do so explicitly, and not
through precedential subterfuge of the sort displayed in Neder.

260. Id. at 149 n.4 (majority opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
261. The Court’s unwillingness to abide by Fulminante is not only evident in its
decisions addressed to review of instructional error that causes the jury not to find each
element of the offense charged under the proper legal standard. Other errors that seem
“structural”—or at the very least seem not to be “quantitatively assess[able] in the context
of the other evidence presented” and therefore not susceptible to harmless-error analysis,
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991) (describing “trial errors” that are
subject to harmless-error review)—that the Court recently has subjected to
harmless-error review include improper judicial involvement in plea negotiations, United
States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (2013); improper denial of a state-provided
peremptory challenge, Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2009); and the failure to
submit to the jury a sentencing factor that the jury should have decided, Washington v.
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–22 (2006).
262. See Coenen, supra note 15, at 1235–39; Levinson, supra note 15, at 891–92;
Shephard, supra note 15, at 1185–1205; Karlan, supra note 15, at 2021. Precedent
containing an overly narrow definition of a right can then, in turn, wreak havoc when it is
applied in other remedial contexts. See Coenen, supra note 15, at 1235–39 (noting that
the high costs of automatic reversal at the appellate level cause appellate courts to set
high precedential standards for trial courts to meet to order a reversal, although it is
much less costly to cure these errors at the trial level than at the appellate level).

Do Not Delete

2016]

9/21/2016 5:34 PM

HARMLESS ERROR REVISITED

109

C. Recent Habeas Cases
In its 1993 Brecht v. Abrahamson decision, the Supreme
Court decided to abandon the “stringent” Chapman principle for
a “less onerous” test for evaluating the harmfulness of
constitutional error challenged on collateral review. 263 The Court
justified its action by pointing to the state’s interest in the
finality of convictions that had survived direct review, comity,
federalism, the interest of maintaining the prominence of the
trial itself (which often had taken place years earlier), the
difficulty of retrials years after the original trial, and a perceived
imbalance between other costs and benefits of continuing to
apply Chapman on habeas. 264 Since Brecht, the Court has become
even more demanding in its descriptions of what habeas
petitioners must show in order to establish harm and secure
collateral relief for convictions tainted by constitutional error. 265
This change in the law of harmless-error review has been, if
not popular among civil libertarians and others who desire closer
federal oversight of state criminal processes, certainly defensible.
Retrying a successful habeas petitioner years after the original
conviction is difficult, given the erosion of memory and the
dispersion of witnesses, 266 and the other reasons Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the author of Brecht, provided in support of its
holding also are far from trivial. Unfortunately, however, Brecht
and its progeny have worked their change—part of a
decades-long transformation of habeas from a regime preoccupied
with the vindication of federal rights into a regime principally
concerned with whether petitioners are guilty or innocent 267—
through a treatment of precedent that has shown insufficient
regard for rule-of-law values.
Consider, first, Brecht’s treatment of Kotteakos, 268 which
Brecht purported to adopt as the new standard for evaluating
whether constitutional trial error had been harmless on

263. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
264. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635–37 (1993). For further discussion on
Brecht, see supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 102–111 and accompanying text.
266. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
267. For an excellent account of this shift and an argument that a new movement
towards greater regard for procedural interests may be underway, see generally Justin F.
Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2071 (2014).
268. Recall that Kotteakos contained an elaboration of how to apply 28 U.S.C. § 391,
the statutory predecessor to the present harmless-error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. See
supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
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collateral review. 269 Recall again how, in Kotteakos, the Court
was at pains to emphasize that harmless-error analysis must
look to the likely effect of the error on the jury, and not be based
on the reviewing court’s opinion whether the jury likely would
have convicted had the error not occurred. 270 Indeed, as we have
just seen, a careful reading of Justice Rutledge’s Kotteakos
opinion has caused many commentators—including some
Supreme Court Justices—to question whether the analysis
Kotteakos prescribes materially differs from that required by
Chapman. 271 In any event, clearly, Kotteakos does not say or
intimate that an error is to be held harmless if the defendant
fails to show that he likely would have been acquitted but for the
error.
Brecht badly mischaracterizes Kotteakos in adopting it as the
harmless-error standard to govern collateral review. Brecht
contains no admonition against using the likelihood of conviction
absent the error as a proxy for harmlessness. Nor does it say
anything about how Kotteakos emphasized the need to keep the
focus on whether the error likely affected the jury. Instead,
Brecht says that the Kotteakos standard requires a habeas
petitioner to show—Brecht summarily places the burden of
persuasion on the petitioner despite Kotteakos’s indication that
the burden should lie with the government when the error is
nontechnical 272—more than just a “reasonable possibility” that
the error contributed to the verdict. 273 But this “reasonable
possibility” language does not come from Kotteakos; indeed it is
patently in tension with what Justice Rutledge says in explaining
how courts are to determine whether an error should be treated
as harmless. 274 Rather, it is reverse engineered from a passage in
Chapman indicating that an error is not harmless if there is a
“reasonable possibility” that it “might have contributed to the
conviction.” 275 Thus, a blatant logical fallacy underlies Brecht’s
adoption of a more-than-a-reasonable-possibility standard:
269. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
272. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765–66 (1946).
273. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For further discussion on Brecht, see supra notes 89–99.
274. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (“But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without striping the erroneous action from the whole, that
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that
substantial rights were not affected.”) For Justice Rutlege’s full explanation, see supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
275. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85, 86–87 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Brecht posits (dubiously, as we have seen) 276 that the Kotteakos
standard is appreciably more forgiving of error than the
Chapman standard, observes that Chapman requires a remedy if
there is a “reasonable possibility” that the error “might have
contributed to the verdict,” 277 and infers from this requirement of
Chapman the logically faulty conclusion that Kotteakos requires
more than such a reasonable possibility. 278
Even more tenuously, Brecht then uses the phrase “actual
prejudice” to describe the more-than-a-reasonable-possibility
showing that, Brecht says, Kotteakos requires for an applicant to
obtain a remedy. 279 But again here, the phrase “actual prejudice”
does not appear in Kotteakos; it comes from United States v.
Lane, a 1986 decision authored by Chief Justice Burger that used
the phrase without citation in purporting to apply Kotteakos to
find that a misjoinder of criminal defendants under Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 8(b) 280 had been harmless. 281
More importantly, it is a component of what petitioners seeking
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily must
show in order to establish a constitutional violation. 282 And in
that context, it means showing a “reasonable probability” of a
different outcome but for the error. 283 Thus, Brecht effectively
signals that a habeas petitioner must establish a “reasonable
probability” of nonconviction but for the error—a showing that is
far more onerous than the one Justice Rutledge prescribed in
Kotteakos. 284 This signal was reinforced by Brecht’s application of
Kotteakos in its brief explanation of why the error at petitioner’s
trial had been harmless. Brecht focused heavily on the evidence
276. See supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text.
277. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
278. See id. It is of course logically possible for the two standards to differ
appreciably and yet for both to support a conclusion that there has been harm if there is a
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.
279. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637(internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Rule 8(b) states:
The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series
of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may
be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not
be charged in each count.
281. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446–49.
282. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481–82 (2000) (observing that,
when a criminal defendant alleges that his or her attorney’s performance during a legal
proceeding, either at trial or on appeal, was constitutionally ineffective, the defendant
ordinarily must establish “actual prejudice”).
283. See id. at 482. (emphasis added) (defining “actual prejudice” as “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
284. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

Do Not Delete

112

9/21/2016 5:34 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[54:1

of guilt, and said nothing about the likelihood of the error playing
a role in the jury’s decision to return a guilty verdict. 285
The Court’s more recent decisions addressing the standard
for harmless error on collateral review continue the practice of
applying precedent in a disingenuous manner. As explained
above, in 1996 (three years after Brecht), Congress enacted
§ 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA, which bars habeas relief for errors of
law unless the error involved an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent. 286 In 2003, in Mitchell v. Esparza, the
Court held that § 2254(d)(1) bars habeas relief for constitutional
error that was held harmless under Chapman by a state
appellate court unless that court’s application of Chapman was
unreasonable. 287 Then, in 2007, in Fry v. Pliler, the Court
rejected an argument that § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted in
Esparza, had effectively superseded Brecht. 288
In describing the petitioner’s argument as “implausible” and
reaffirming the continuing applicability of Brecht, Justice Scalia
(the author of Fry) characterized Brecht’s “actual prejudice”
standard
as
stricter
than
Esparza’s
“more
liberal
AEDPA/Chapman standard, which requires only that the state
court’s harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt determination be
unreasonable.” 289 In fact, Fry says, Brecht “obviously subsumes
the [more liberal AEDPA/Chapman standard].” 290 Thus, through
this reinterpretation of Brecht, Fry effectively transforms
Kotteakos—which, again, Brecht purports to adopt—into a
standard that requires a habeas petitioner now to show
something more than that no reasonable jurist could find the
error harmless under Chapman. To borrow from the rhetorical
style of Fry’s author: When one reads Justice Rutledge’s
Kotteakos opinion291 and compares it with what Fry implies about
its contents, one quickly comes to realize that we have entered
The Land of Make-Believe.
While Fry, through its treatment of Brecht, effectively
catapulted the Kotteakos standard past the point where it might
reasonably be described as merely “permissive” or “forgiving” of
error—perhaps “hippie-parent indulgent” would come closer to
285. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 17, 100–101 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
289. Fry v. Pliler, 551, U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007) (emphasis added); see also supra
notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
290. Fry, 551 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added); see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
291. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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doing it justice—Davis v. Ayala, decided in 2015, sought to dispel
any misperception that the “more liberal” AEDPA/Chapman
standard is in fact petitioner-friendly. As we have just seen, Fry
stated that Brecht (and thus Kotteakos) “subsumes” the
AEDPA/Chapman standard described in Esparza. In recognition
of the logical rule that satisfaction of a more demanding burden
of persuasion always will constitute satisfaction of a less
demanding burden of persuasion when the former subsumes the
latter, 292 Fry also acknowledged that there is no reason to require
formal application of both tests. 293
Nonetheless, Justice Alito (author of the Ayala majority
opinion) criticized the Ninth Circuit for declining to perform the
logically unnecessary analysis of whether the state court’s
harmlessness determination under Chapman was itself
reasonable. 294 Concluding that the state appellate court had not
unreasonably applied Chapman, Ayala made it very clear that
satisfying the putatively “more liberal” AEDPA/Chapman
standard is not to be a walk in the park. To prevail under this
standard, petitioners must show that “fair-minded jurists could
[not] disagree on [the] correctness” of the state appellate court
finding that a challenged error was harmless under Chapman. 295
Put another way, habeas petitioners must establish that the
state appellate court’s decision “was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded
disagreement.” 296 Thus, given the holding in Fry, habeas
petitioners now apparently must make some unspecified showing
beyond this in order to establish that constitutional error was
harmful within the meaning of Brecht/Kotteakos. 297 One simply
292. Similarly, a failure to satisfy a less demanding burden of persuasion always will
constitute a failure to satisfy a more demanding burden of persuasion when the latter
subsumes the former.
293. Fry, 551 U.S. at 120; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
294. Ayala v. Davis, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). For further discussion of criticism
of lower courts’ application of Fry, see supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
Conducting the AEDPA/Chapman analysis prescribed in Esparza was logically
unnecessary because the Ninth Circuit, in a divided panel opinion, concluded that the
petitioner had satisfied the more demanding Brecht test. See Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2196–97.
295. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
296. Id.
297. To be sure, the Court continues to describe the Brecht/Kotteakos test as
requiring a showing of “actual prejudice.” Id. As we have seen, “actual prejudice” is a
phrase that does not come from Kotteakos, but that in other contexts requires showing a
reasonable probability of nonconviction but for the error. See supra notes 279–284 and
accompanying text. But it is not at all evident how the “actual prejudice” test can be
described as more demanding than the AEDPA/Chapman test that it is said to subsume.
The “actual prejudice” test is entirely different in kind from the AEDPA/Chapman test. It
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cannot read Justice Rutledge’s opinion and maintain that this is
a principled distillation of Kotteakos.
Again, my purpose is not to quarrel with the Court’s
adoption of a very tough standard for establishing the
harmfulness of error on collateral review. Perhaps the standard
the Court has adopted is appropriate in view of the factors it
cited in Brecht for moving away from Chapman. 298 But, I submit,
institutional damage is done when the Court purports to root its
new standard in precedent that says nothing of the sort. Brecht
and its progeny are constitutional common law—a type of law
that, again, is supposed to evolve as data and experience reveal a
need for change. The Court should be forthright about the fact
that it perceived a need for change. It should not pretend that its
recent holdings are anchored in precedent that not only do not
say what they are cited for saying, but actually say something
close to the opposite. The Court invites cynicism and undermines
its reputation as an institution guided by principle when it
behaves in this way.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
Part I demonstrates that Congress and the Supreme Court
are largely unconstrained by constitutional limitations in
fashioning harmless-error doctrines to govern on direct and
collateral review. Part II shows that there is a serious need for
doctrinal reform in both contexts. Part III seeks to initiate a
discussion about the paths that reform might take. Most of this
Part’s suggestions for reform flow naturally from arguments
developed in Parts I and II. To the extent that they press beyond
the foundation laid earlier in the paper, they are preliminary and
designed to provoke thought and, hopefully, conversation about
how the present approach to harmless-error review might be
improved.

looks at the likelihood of a different result had the trial error not occurred, while the
AEDPA/Chapman test focuses on whether appellate judges reasonably could conclude
that the error was harmless under Chapman. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–99 (explaining the
different requirements of each test). The two tests are not logically interrelated; they are
apples and oranges.
298. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635–37 (1946) (emphasizing the finality of
convictions, comity, federalism, the interest of maintaining prominence of the trial itself,
the difficulty of retrials years after the original trial, and a perceived imbalance of other
costs and benefits of applying Chapman on collateral review); see also supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
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A. The Constitution & the Path to Reform
As Part I shows, the Constitution requires reviewing courts
to vacate or reverse convictions marred by constitutional error
only in circumstances where the applicant for relief establishes
that the statute underlying the conviction is unconstitutional on
its face or cannot constitutionally be applied to the facts of the
case. 299 Beyond this, harmless-error analysis may proceed
without constitutional constraint except that, of course, it may
not be arbitrary or otherwise violate the equal-protection
guarantee or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 300
Importantly, this means that the Constitution does not
forbid appellate courts or courts conducting collateral review
from excusing errors that have resulted in missing jury findings
or other structural defects, or even from adopting a
harmless-error analysis that turns on nothing more than
whether the error likely caused an innocent person to be
wrongfully convicted of a crime. Transforming harmless-error
analysis into mere prediction about likely innocence based on a
cold appellate record would be a regrettable development, but it
would not violate the Constitution.
B. A Unitary Standard (and Abandoning Chapman)
As Part II.A shows, there is no reason to privilege
constitutional errors by subjecting them to a different
harmless-error test than that applied to “nonconstitutional”
errors. There are at least three reasons for stopping the practice.
First, there is no basis for concluding that, as a class, errors that
the Court describes as “constitutional” always tend to work a
greater harm on criminal defendants than those labeled
“nonconstitutional.” 301 Second, there is reason to doubt that
judges and their clerks can and do make the fine distinctions
required between a faithful application of Chapman to
constitutional error and a faithful application of Kotteakos to
nonconstitutional error. 302 Third, there is a serious argument to
be made that all infractions of the positive law that governs
criminal trials are “constitutional” in that they violate the
due-process guarantee, which (it may plausibly be argued)
requires compliance with all procedural requirements that

299.
300.
301.
302.

See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207–217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218–224 and accompanying text.
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materially inform the process for obtaining criminal
convictions. 303
What, then, should the unitary standard be for evaluating
errors amenable to harmless-error review? 304 In my view, the
approach for which Justice Traynor argued in the immediate
aftermath of Chapman does the best job of legitimizing and
rationalizing harmless-error doctrine, and of prescribing a
remedial regime that American appellate judges might actually
administer faithfully. Traynor called for rooting the
harmless-error standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 305 and construing
the statute to direct reviewing courts to provide a remedy unless
there is a “high probability” that the error did not affect the
jury’s judgment. 306
The merits of moving away from a standard based in
constitutional common law (the most plausible understanding of
Chapman’s ontology307) and anchoring harmless-error review in
§ 2111, the federal harmless-error statute, are straightforward.
While constitutional common law is pervasive, there are many
who contest its legitimacy. 308 One need not align oneself with the
critics of constitutional common law in order to see it as
preferable to ground remedial doctrines in legislation that is
perfectly constitutional and that reasonably can be construed to
govern the problem under examination. 309 Indeed, Chapman
303. See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text.
304. I leave to the next subsection consideration of whether there should be errors
not subject to harmless-error review.
305. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 42–43. As Professor Meltzer argued, it is a
stretch to treat Chapman as an elaboration of § 2111, given all that it contains and
mandates. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. But if the Court were to
jettison Chapman, there is no reason why § 2111 should not be held to govern the federal
harmless-error field, notwithstanding the fact that it textually describes only those errors
that reviewing courts should disregard. See supra note 9. If we can infer a “negative” or
“dormant” commerce clause doctrine from constitutional text that in terms confers only a
power to regulate, surely we can infer from statutory text admonishing courts to withhold
remedies for a certain class of errors a directive that they continue to provide remedies—
in accordance with customary practice at the time the statute was adopted, see supra Part
II.A—for errors that do not fall within the specified class.
306. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 43–51.
307. See supra Part II.B.
308. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of the Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). For a summary of an
argument that remedial doctrines designed to address constitutional violations ought to
originate with Congress, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.1.2, at 652
(7th ed. 2016) (describing the dissenting opinions in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
309. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. One might object that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 is inadequate to supplant Chapman because it does not in terms directly regulate
state courts, as Chapman does. In fact, the text of § 2111 could be read to regulate state
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itself recognized congressional prerogative to replace its
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt principle with an “appropriate”
statutory standard. 310 Mysteriously, however, Chapman did not
even mention § 2111, let alone explain why an “appropriate”
standard could not be distilled from it.
In fact, as Traynor demonstrated, § 2111 is cast in general
terms that are reasonably subject to translation into an
“appropriate” and administrable harmless-error standard. The
statute plausibly could be construed to give rise to at least three
formulations that would accord with commonly applied proof
standards: a test focusing on whether it was more probable than
not that the error did not affect the jury (which would accord
with the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard); a test focusing
on whether it was highly probable that the error did not affect
the jury (which would accord with the clear-and-convincing
-evidence standard); and a test focusing on whether it was almost
certain that the error did not affect the jury (which would accord
with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test that Chapman did in
fact adopt). 311 Thus, there is no barrier to the Court grounding a
new, unitary harmless-error standard in § 2111.
After surveying the range of standards through which § 2111
might reasonably be operationalized, Traynor argued that the
Court should adopt the second, “highly probable” test—one that
would accord with the clear-and-convincing evidence standard. 312
Traynor regarded the first, “more likely than not” test as
inappropriate for two reasons: it would entail too great a risk of
affirming judgments influenced by error, and it would tacitly
invite reviewing courts to affirm whenever they believed that the
jury had reached the correct result. 313 He thought that the third,
courts. See supra note 9. And surely, if the Supreme Court can regulate the state courts
through constitutional common law as it did in Chapman, it also would be within
Congress’s power to regulate directly the provision of remedies for constitutional
violations that occur in state criminal trials. In any event, even if § 2111 is (more
plausibly) read only to regulate federal courts, it clearly regulates the Supreme Court,
which of course has jurisdiction to review how state appellate courts administer remedies
for violations of federal law during state criminal trials. Because state appellate courts
ought to recognize the primacy of any harmless-error standard that Congress might
lawfully require the Supreme Court to use to review their treatment of federal trial error,
the effect of such congressional regulation of the Supreme Court should be a de facto
imposition of the statute’s harmless-error standard on state appellate courts.
310. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
311. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 33–37, 42–51.
312. See id. at 45.
313. See id. at 35. I fully agree with Traynor’s assessment of the first test. Even
under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, erroneous convictions are too often
upheld. See Poulin, supra note 70, at 996 (noting that appellate courts had affirmed
through written opinions the convictions of 133 of the first 200 defendants exonerated by
DNA evidence, and that nearly a third of these opinions had noted error but concluded
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“beyond a reasonable doubt” test, if faithfully applied, simply
invited too many reversals and thus risked a return to the days
when appellate courts reversed indiscriminately. 314 In contrast,
he thought the second test sufficiently demanding and properly
calibrated. 315 Moreover, the second test could be administered
without inevitably morphing into either a rule of near-automatic
reversal or a rule of near-automatic affirmance in cases where
there is strong evidence of guilt. 316
In 2016, there is little reason for concern about appellate
courts construing the Chapman principle as a rule calling for
nearly automatic reversals. Harmless-error rulings are
commonplace and in no way discouraged by the Supreme
Court. 317 The more pertinent question today is whether, if the
Court were to discard the Chapman principle in favor of a “high
probability” test grounded in § 2111, would more errors be
forgiven? I think not—especially if the Court were careful to
explain its move as grounded not in a desire to decrease the rate
at which appellate remedies are provided, but rather in a desire
to clarify a badly muddled doctrine and to more accurately
rationalize and describe the present realities of harmless-error
review. For it is simply inaccurate to describe appellate practice
today as one where courts tend to provide remedies unless they
are nearly certain that the error played no role in the jury’s
decision to convict, as the Chapman principle purports to
require. 318
Indeed, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt proof standard has
always been inapt for use in connection with harmless-error
review. The standard derives, of course, from the burden of proof
that juries are instructed to apply in determining whether to
return a guilty verdict and convict a criminal defendant of a
crime. But before making such a finding, the jury is exposed to
all of the admissible evidence that the government and the
defendant wish it to see and hear about what actually happened.
In other words, within the American criminal system, the finding
that it was harmless) (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 95, 107–08 (2008)).
314. See TRAYNOR, supra note 1, at 35–37, 43–44.
315. See id. at 44–45.
316. See id. at 49–51.
317. See generally supra Parts II.B, II.C.
318. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistent ways
in which the Court has operationalized Chapman); see also Poulin, supra note 70, at
1023–36 (exhaustively documenting the myriad ways—all inconsistent with a strict
reading of Chapman—in which courts since Chapman have exercised their power to
withhold remedies for constitutional error during the trial process on the ground that it
did not cause “harm”).
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of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is supposed to follow exposure
to all admissible facts that reasonably might be thought to bear
on that finding.
But reviewing courts are (quite sensibly) precluded from
considering direct evidence about the jury’s deliberations; they
can only speculate about how a rational jury likely would have
made use of the evidence with which it was presented. 319 When
the nature of the inquiry is inherently and necessarily
hypothetical, why demand a conclusion—as Chapman does—
under a standard that purports to forswear doubt (or at least
“reasonable” doubt) about its correctness? The conscientious
judicial mind should almost always harbor doubt about
conclusions reached not through evidence, but through
hypothesis and conjecture. Thus, by its very nature, the
Chapman principle requires a conclusion that the conscientious
judge should balk at reaching. No wonder then that, as a
practical matter, harmless-error analysis quickly moved away
from a strict reading of Chapman and towards a more judicially
administrable regime—one that the “high probability” standard
more accurately describes as a matter of reality. 320
In sum, the Court should stop privileging constitutional
error and abandon Chapman in favor of a unitary harmless-error
standard that does not ask judges to express near-certitude about
a conclusion that by its very nature is somewhat doubtful. The
Court should describe its new standard as an elaboration of 28
U.S.C. § 2111, the federal harmless-error statute. Finally, the
Court should consider a clarifying reform—i.e., adoption of a
“high probability” harmless-error test—that would more
accurately rationalize and describe the rather highly qualified
willingness of today’s appellate courts to provide remedies for
errors that occur during the process leading to criminal
convictions.
C. Abandoning Fulminante
Again, the Constitution does not require a rule of automatic
reversal in situations other than where an applicant for relief
establishes the unconstitutionality of the statute of conviction,
either facially or as-applied. 321 That said, adherence to basic
constitutional values and sound public policy require that
convictions infected by certain types of error never be permitted
319. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (precluding post hoc inquiry into the nature of the
jury’s deliberations other than in rare circumstances).
320. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 190.
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to stand. Unfortunately, as Part II.B shows, the trial
error/structural defect framework that the Supreme Court
prescribed in Fulminante does a very poor job of drawing the line
of demarcation between such errors and the default category of
errors, to which harmless-error review applies. Fulminante
permits instances of egregious government misconduct—e.g., the
admission into evidence of a coerced confession 322—to go without
a remedy. And if faithfully implemented (which it has not been),
it also can require remedies for relatively inconsequential errors
committed by government actors acting in good faith. 323 The
Court can do better than Fulminante in defining the class of
errors that should not be subject to harmless-error review.
How might the Court pursue reform in this area? It might
start by acknowledging that, regardless of their guilt, persons
convicted of crimes who press claims of error on direct and
collateral review serve as private attorneys general and, in that
role, function as essential instruments for ensuring proper regard
for fundamental constitutional criminal rules. 324 In determining
what constitutional criminal rules are so “fundamental” that
their infraction always requires a remedy, we might start by
noting the apparent agreement among all current Supreme Court
Justices that the fair-trial guarantee always requires, at the very
least, an impartial judge, a jury instruction that correctly states
the relevant standard of proof, assistance of counsel for the
accused, and a fair jury. 325 Thus, errors undermining these
foundational elements of the American criminal trial never
should be subjected to harmless-error review.

322. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
323. Cf. supra notes 242–253 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court’s struggle, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), to rationalize a
harmless-error doctrine to govern in circumstances where the jury did not find an element
of the offense but where no rational jury could have failed to make such a finding had it
been properly instructed).
324. Harmless-error doctrine has been subjected to withering criticism over the years
for failing to account for values other than the accuracy of criminal convictions—e.g.,
restraining human rights abuses and protecting the dignity of the accused—that
constitutional criminal procedure rights are designed to protect. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr,
Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L. J. 1509, 1554–
55 (2009); Ogletree, supra note 15, at 161–72: Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (1988).
325. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 158 (2006) (describing
elements of the trial structure whose deprivation necessarily renders a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence) (citing
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)) (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.
& Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.). The Justices in the Gonzalez-Lopez majority appear to
have a broader conception of the fair-trial guarantee and therefore likely would agree that
it contains the elements specified in Justice Alito’s dissent.
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For similar reasons, I submit, constitutional violations
rooted in discrimination on the basis of race and other immutable
characteristics always undermine fundamental values. 326
Sensitivity to our ugly history of racism, sexism, and other forms
of unconstitutional prejudice, and the grave harm their
persistence inflicts on our institutions of justice, demand that
nothing short of a zero-tolerance policy be applied when some
agent of government violates the equal protection guarantee
through invidious discrimination. 327 Indeed, we might well
consider going a step or two further and holding that intentional
misconduct by a government actor of any sort undermines
fundamental values and should automatically yield a remedy
when demonstrated to the satisfaction of a reviewing court. In
any event, the important point is that there is a glaring need to
move beyond the Fulminante standard, which lacks practicality
and therefore is not faithfully and predictably administered.
D. Abandoning Brecht
As Part II.C shows, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
disingenuous treatment of precedent to create a harmless-error
test to govern collateral review that will rarely yield a remedy. In
order to establish that a constitutional trial error requires a new
trial, habeas petitioners must satisfy a standard—supposedly
rooted in Brecht/Kotteakos—that is in some unexplained way
more demanding than the AEDPA/Chapman standard, which

326. In one context where claims of unlawful discrimination often arise—the use of
peremptory challenges to jurors during the jury selection process (see, e.g., Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the Court held that unconstitutional race-based
challenges and prescribing a process for resolving claims of error)—the federal appeals
courts have unanimously concluded that a proven constitutional violation never can be
harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Batson error is structural and can never be harmless); Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d
618, 632 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Ford v. Norris, 67
F.3d 162, 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir.
1992) (same); United States v. Legrand, 483 Fed App’x 771, 777 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished opinion) (same); see also Vazquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260–64 (1986)
(pre-Fulminante decision holding that racial discrimination in the grand jury process is
not amenable to harmless-error review); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 &
n.9 (1979) (pre-Fulminante decision holding that a criminal conviction is void if the
prosecutor deliberately challenged the defendant because of his race).
327. Cf. Calhoun v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1136, 1137–38 (2013) (statement of
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joined) (respecting the denial of the petition
for a writ of certiorari the Court denounced in extremely strong terms an appeal to racial
prejudice made by the federal prosecutor at trial, collected authority demonstrating that
such appeals were once commonplace, and opined that “[s]uch conduct diminishes the
dignity of our criminal justice system and undermines respect for the rule of law”).
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Brecht/Kotteakos is said to subsume. 328 But even though the
Brecht/Kotteakos standard is said to subsume the
AEDPA/Chapman standard, and even though habeas courts are
not required formally to apply both tests, Ayala makes clear that
habeas courts will act at their peril if they skip over the
AEDPA/Chapman test, and apply only the more demanding
Brecht/Kotteakos test. 329
In my view, the Court’s test for assessing whether error was
harmless on collateral review is far too forgiving. While Brecht
may have been reasonable in making it more difficult for habeas
petitioners who have demonstrated error to obtain a new trial,
the AEDPA—enacted three years after Brecht—is more than
adequate to address the concerns that animated Brecht. Under
the AEDPA, habeas petitioners are unable to obtain relief
without establishing clear error in light of Supreme Court
precedent and that a state appellate court’s harmlessness
determination (if there was one) was itself unreasonable. 330
These showings are far from easy to make, especially if the
harmlessness determination were to be recast in the “high
probability” terms for which I argue. In short, the “high
probability” test ought to apply on both direct and collateral
review.
Be that as it may, a majority of the Court apparently does
not agree that the AEDPA is sufficiently strict. At the very least,
however, the Court should come up with a regime less dismissive
of rule-of-law values, and more judicially administrable, than
that prescribed by Fry and Ayala. Perhaps the Court believes
that habeas petitioners must show some likelihood of innocence.
After all, the Constitution imposes no barrier to the imposition of
such a standard. But if so, the Court should say so explicitly and
forthrightly. For as matters now stand, the tests for determining
whether an error should be excused as harmless on habeas are
extraordinarily difficult to understand and administer.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly half a century ago, Justice Traynor described
then-nascent harmless-error doctrines as giving rise to a “riddle.”
Today, “quagmire” would be a more apt descriptor. The complex
series of doctrines governing the provision of remedies responsive

328.
329.
330.

See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 294–296 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 286–287 and accompanying text.
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to constitutional violations committed during the criminal trial
process are badly in need of reform.
As we have seen, the path to reform is almost entirely
unobstructed by constitutional limitations. Hopefully, the
Supreme Court will come to agree that a housecleaning is
needed, and will consider steps aimed at making harmless-error
review more realistic, more consistent across contexts, and more
transparent about its animating values. The Court could start
this process by adopting a unitary harmless-error test to govern
all error, abandoning the unrealistic trial error/structural defect
framework for assessing whether errors can be excused, and
simplifying and clarifying its approach to harmless-error review
on collateral review.

